Obama’s First Year: Good, Not Great - An Excerpt

Obama’s First Year: Good, Not Great

Being a competent president is not enough in this moment of crisis.
• By: Jack White | Posted: January 20, 2010 at 6:35 AM

In his first year in office, Barack Obama has been a very good president, both at home and abroad. The trouble is that in these difficult times, America does not need a very good president. It needs a great one.
And, judging from his performance during his first year, when his popularity was at its highest and his trove of political capital was at its richest, Obama will never be a great president—unless we force him to be.

It will take generations to dig out from the mess Obama inherited and complete the changes Americans envisioned when they rallied behind his candidacy. The most Obama can do by himself is to nudge the nation a bit further along the path to recovery.
His election was revolutionary. His administration, left to its own devices, will be evolutionary, settling for what it can get even when that’s not nearly good enough. Its calculation seems to be that America is simply not ready for anything more fundamental. It seldom is.

African Americans should have expected that. We ought to remember that our historic role has been to hold up a mirror between what America promises and what it delivers, and try to narrow the gap. We ought to acknowledge that real change takes time, even when a black man is in the White House. Lots of time. More than five decades after segregation was struck down, there have been enormous strides toward freedom, but we are nowhere close to a post-racial society. Yet we keep fighting on—and we must.

We need to bring a similar patience to our expectations for Obama, no matter how let down we may feel by his inability to change America overnight. This is a time for determination, not disappointment. We must keep our eyes on the prize and hold on.
Part of the frustration some of us feel is rooted in Obama’s conciliatory approach to governing. He is the precise opposite of a traditional black leader—a jelly-maker, not a tree-shaker, in Jesse Jackson’s memorable phrase. His default stance is compromise, not confrontation. And he has sometimes been rolled, as when he gave in to Nebraska Sen. Ben Nelson’s bullying on health care reform. Such behavior makes Obama look both weak and cynical. We sometimes want him to be angry and unbending, not calm, cool and conniving. We want him to be a hero and, by his nature, he’s anything but heroic.

But the far greater source of his difficulty lies in the backwardness entrenched in our political system and the small-mindedness it encourages. The self-interested partisanship of politicians such as Nelson and Joe Lieberman is but one, relatively insignificant manifestation of this deep-rooted pathology. A far more dangerous, fundamental measure of the meanness, stubbornness, ignorance and outright stupidity that characterize American politics can be found on the right, in the rise of Sarah Palin and the sudden, explosive growth of the so-called tea party movement.
African Americans have seen this pathology before, when it took the form of a white backlash against the civil rights movement. The white mobs that formed to keep black kids from going to desegregated schools during the 1950s and ‘60s are the spiritual forebears of much of the current anti-Obama coalition, just as Palin, in her shrill anti-intellectualism, is an updated George C. Wallace in high heels. She may not be a bigot, but the brand of know-nothing populism that she is tapping into has always contained a nasty dose of racism and class resentment. It is no coincidence that it has burst back onto the scene with spectacular virulence with the election of a black president, pushing the Republican Party even further to the ridiculous right and reinforcing its tendency to just say no to anything Obama proposes.
Racial animosity alone, of course, does not account for the steep decline in Obama’s popularity. There are deep-seated, valid and troubling questions about his policies, especially his administration’s failure to put hard-pressed breadwinners back to work. In Massachusetts, a blue state if ever there was one, qualms about Obama’s health reform plan helped Republican Scott Brown defeat Democrat Martha Coakley in the battle to take Ted Kennedy’s seat in the U.S. Senate. The Democrats have lost their veto-proof majority in the Senate, and the health care bill could be in danger.
But opposition to Obama’s policies cannot account for the emotional virulence of his opposition. The kind of undiluted loathing that is directed at him, historically, has its roots in racial resentment and like it or not, such hatred is a significant part of the equation. The tea party is an angry, unthinking mob whose passions can never be quelled by appeals to reason, logical arguments or plain facts—the stuff at which Obama excels. A mob can only be defeated by a more powerful movement—and that’s where we come in.

Our history shows that America only progresses when disciplined, principled mass organizations present the government with an irresistible demand. It was that way during the heyday of the civil rights movement. It needs to be that way again.
Obama, because he is who he is and because he is now the president, cannot lead a progressive mass movement. He can only respond to one. We need to build a movement as inspiring and inclusive as the one led by Martin Luther King Jr., that can both defend him and hold his feet to the fire. If we want Obama to be a great president, we have to make him one. He won’t get there without us.

To be or not to be a real Jew, in the American imagination - An Excerpt

To be or not to be a real Jew, in the American imagination
By Jay Michaelson, The Forward


American Jews of a certain class and culture have the scene engraved in their memories: Woody Allen's Alvy Singer in "Annie Hall" at Annie's goyish parents' house, suddenly seen through their eyes as a Hasid, in a long black coat and peyes.

It's a hilarious moment: Allen imagining how he is seen by non-Jews, giving us a great sight gag and, of course, capturing in just a few seconds of film the great anxiety of American Jews that we are "too Jewish," notwithstanding all our best efforts to assimilate.

I wonder, though, how many of us share the unstated assumption of the "Annie Hall" gag: that to be Hasidic is "really Jewish," to be secular is not really Jewish, and everything else lies somewhere in between. How often has our culture set up "Fiddler on the Roof" as an imagined Jewish ideal: real Jews in a real shtetl, practicing real Jewish traditions for the real Jewish God. Never mind that all these were creatures of fiction: what is most authentically Jewish, many of us believe, is the old-time religion (a non-Jewish term) of black hats and the Pale.

Arguably, a similar trope crops up in this year's "A Serious Man," which begins with an extended scene of a possible demonic possession, set in the shtetl and performed in Yiddish. As the film cuts to Minnesota from Eastern Europe, the sense of dislocation is palpable.

It?s not, of course, that we want to be the shtetl Jews of Anatevka - only that we continue to see them as the "real" ones, and the rest of us, well, as a kind of hybridization, or adaptation. Thus there persists in the American Jewish imagination an anxiety of inauthenticity - that someone, somewhere, is the real Jew, but I?m not it.

The myth of authenticity, however, has got to go.

First, of course, it's not historically accurate. Traditional Jews didn't wear long black coats until the 18th century (notwithstanding some recent, and absurd, images of Moses crossing the Red Sea in a fur-lined shtrayml).

Moreover, until the advent of modernity, the notion that if you were "really" religious, you would dress anachronistically, simply did not arise in Jewish thought.

Distinctive dress, modest dress, visible signs like the yarmulke, sure - but never the idea that to be "real" was to be so radically other from one?s own place and time. In fact, with only a few exceptions, everything that we think of as "really Jewish" came along at a particular place and time, because of particular historical circumstances, and was never universally shared (by Sephardim, for example).

More importantly, however, the entire notion of authenticity is a false projection of particular historical quirks onto an imagined ideal of "realness" that artificially freezes culture, and thus spells its demise. The truth is that there is no single authentic Jewishness.

Like any living culture, Jewish culture (and religion) evolves over time in order to remain vibrant. Of course, there are certain core values, myths and cultural traits that remain relatively constant. But bagels, bookishness and bar mitzvahs all evolved historically; none is more "really Jewish" than sushi, sports or a Sweet 16.

Orthodox fidelity to the law, anxieties of dislocation, reformist rationalization - all arose along the way. Even the ultra-Orthodox maxim that "innovation is forbidden by Torah" is, of course, a 19th-century innovation. To imagine that cultural forms must remain static to be authentic is to doom a culture to obsolescence.

It is also, of course, to privilege some cultural forms over others. Why bagels and not jahnoon? Why Joseph Caro's legalistic Shulchan Aruch but not his radical, mystical "Maggid Mesharim"? And for that matter, why a white male rabbi over an African-American female one? Anytime we claim that one cultural form is more authentic than another, we are replicating privilege and marginalization.

And worst of all, by ossifying and reifying a fake authenticity as "the real thing," we actually undermine the attempt to create true authenticity on the part of progressive Jews.

Meaningful authenticity isn't about an old religious form or a Yiddish pun (please, enough with cutesy invocations of "gelt" and "schlep"). It's when a religious, literary or cultural form - old, new or alt-neu - speaks to the depths of what it is to be human.

If a guitar-playing, meditating female rabbi resonates more with the souls of her followers than does a nigun-singing, Talmud-learning male one, she is the more authentic spiritual leader. If ecstatic prayer speaks to and from the spirit more than a supposedly consistent rationalism, then it, too, is more authentic, notwithstanding the howls of the secularist. Authenticity isn't about form, it's about getting to what matters.

For progressive Judaism to succeed, it must jettison the myth of authenticity based on some "real" forms that some "real" Jews really believe in and replace it with a personalized notion of authenticity measured by integrity and individual coherence.

Is my Buddhist-Judaism less authentic than someone else?s more carefully patrolled boundaries of permissibility? Quite the contrary: It is more authentic, because it is more faithful to the truth of my experience. Not preference, not whim - but carefully considered internal coherence.

Those who prefer traditional forms sometimes deride innovations as "compromises". Yet, which is the more objectionable compromise: bending the rules to eat hot food on nonkosher plates, or clinging to a ritual form that may no longer hold any meaning, is historical in its origin and may actively impede other ethical values (such as connecting with people of other faiths)?

Likewise, sometimes traditional forms are derided as intellectual compromises by those who insist on a more rigorous secularism. But which is the real compromise: admitting the irrational desire to pray, or maintaining some pseudo-intellectual purity that cuts off the heart despite the soul?

Progressive Jews don't do what they do to compromise the authenticity of Judaism; they do it to maintain it. Sure, plenty of lazy Jews simply indulge their laziness, whether as ritual wafflers, ethical slobs or intellectual weaklings.

But for those who care about living an authentic life, values shift because of consideration, not spinelessness. To say "This works for me" can, indeed, be a summary denial of responsibility. But to say so meaningfully, based on discernment and introspection, is a mark of integrity.

The myth of authenticity, in contrast, is an abdication of introspection and personal responsibility. Thanks, but I'm not religious. Thanks, but I'm Orthodox. Thanks, but I don't need to think any further. It's a lot easier to say "This is real Judaism, and I do/don't practice it" than to look closely at what form might work to do the important stuff (afflict the comfortable, comfort the afflicted) for you.

Obviously, newer Jewish forms are not intrinsically superior to older ones; the books of the Bible have endured precisely because they continue to speak to so many people, despite the gulf in history and culture. And to be sure, the ancientness of these texts is part of their power: They bind us to history in a way that newer books cannot. But this power is not because of some imagined authenticity, or some unbroken connection between us and biblical Israelites who, after all, imagined that the world was a small, flat place, had no concept of medicine or industrialization, had notions about nation, ethnicity and gender that hopefully would have no place in contemporary society.

No, Biblical Israelites are not the real Jews. Neither are Hasidim, 20th-century modernists, neurotic New York psychoanalysts, Moroccan saints, angst-ridden intellectuals, High Reformers or anyone else.

Real Jews are all of the above - and the rest of us who take Jewishness seriously, in one form or another.

Real Jews speak with Southern accents, keep one day of yomtov (the holiday), hike in the wilderness, eat shrimp, intermarry, become ba'alei teshuvah, do karate, are bisexual, are neoconservative. Real Jews are the ones who make Judaism real for themselves.

In the past few years, there?s been a fair amount of attention to novelty Jews. Yuri Foreman, for example, is both a rabbinical student and a boxing champion. What?! Matisyahu is a Hasid and a pop star. What?! The media love those interrobangs (the ?! symbol), but behind every one is an implicit assumption that Jews are supposed to be one way and not another. Boxing rabbis, lesbian rabbis, "Adventure Rabbis" and yoga-teacher rabbis - these images are foreign, funny or weird to some people, because the word "rabbi" still conjures up a very particular image: usually male, nebbishy and bearded. (Not that there?s anything wrong with that - I'm all three.)

But that image is just a form. Indeed, when I read about Jewish farmers, Jewish Sufis and Jewish pro wrestlers, I think, good for the Jews.

I'm generally reluctant to praise one culture over another, but if there is one distinctive feature I love about Jewish culture, it's how, in our many diasporas, we have amalgamated so many contradictions, oblique angles and diverse perspectives on how it is to be human.

Granted, that pattern also leads to Jewish mobsters, Jewish financial shysters and Jewish arms merchants, but Jewish crooks aren't bad because they?re inauthentic; they're bad because they're bad. The basic principles of change, growth and evolution are what has kept us going these thousands of years, as much as the basic bedrock values that remain more or less constant. For Jews, even more than for others, change is authenticity.

So let's get used to slippery slopes, murky swamps and the many other geographies of blending and uncertainty. Whether or not Jews have traveled here before, they are where we live today. Finding authenticity without is ahistorical and self-defeating. Finding it within is holy

The Geopolitics Of The Dubai Debt Crisis: It’s Iran vs. The United States - An Excerpt

The Geopolitics Of The Dubai Debt Crisis: It’s Iran vs. The United States
by John Carney|Nov. 28, 2009

The role of Iran may be the most overlooked in the Dubai debt crisis.

Of all the states of the United Arab Emirates federation, Dubai has maintained the closest ties to Iran. Indeed, as international pressure has built on Iran over the past decade, Dubai has prospered from those ties. It provides critical banking and trade links for Iran, often serving as the go-between for European or Asian companies and financial firms that want to do business with Iran without violating international sanctions.

Abu Dhabi, the wealthiest member of the UAE and a close ally of the US, may be pressuring Dubai to limit its links to Iran. Indeed, this pressure may be behind statements coming from Abu Dhabi about offering “selective” support for Dubai. Companies or creditors thought to be too linked to Iran could find themselves shut out of any bailout.

The United States government, which has remained somewhat taciturn throughout this crisis, is no doubt encouraging Abu Dhabi to apply this pressure. In part because of Dubai’s connections to Iran, US financial institutions are not among the biggest creditors to Dubai World.

It’s not all Iran, of course. The problems in Dubai, the member of the United Arab Emirates that has found itself in a dire financial crisis, closely mirror those behind the global financial crisis.

Over the past decade, the country attempted to diversify its economy away from dependence on its declining oil reserves—and largely succeeded. But, like a Wall Street investment bank attempting to overcome the decline of its traditional businesses by becoming heavily invested in leveraged real estate products, Dubai accumulated huge debt obligations—estimated to amount to some $80 billion. Much of Dubai’s assets were dependent on tourism, shipping, construction and real estate—which have been in trouble during the global economic downturn.

Like its fellow members of the UAE, Dubai is ruled by an expansive royal family. In this case, they are called Al Maktoum family. Exactly what counts as the personal property of ruling family and what is government owned in Dubai is more than a bit fuzzy. The Dubai government owns three companies: the Investment Corporation of Dubai; Dubai Holding, which is run by Mohammed Al Gergawi; and Dubai World, which is run by Sultan bin Sulayem.

Abu Dhabi has been trying to put pressure on Dubai to cut ties to Iran. The split between Abu Dhabi and Iran is in part rooted in an older territorial dispute, fear of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, religious differences between Shiites and Sunnis, and—importantly—Abu Dhabi’s close ties to Washington, DC.

The UAE is close to reaching a nuclear power cooperation deal with Washington, a move that many regional experts say would challenge the traditional Saudi hegemony in the Gulf. One sticking point in the negotiations with Washington has been concerns that Dubai could share US nuclear technology with Iran.

This power struggle between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia is also playing a role. In May, the UAE pulled out of a proposed Gulf monetary union over Saudi insistence that it would host the regional central bank.

Dubai, which is a very open and tolerant place compared to Iran, is viewed by many Iranians as a place to let their hair down. It has a thriving Iranian ex-pat community. Iran is Dubai airport’s top destination, with more than 300 flights per week.

More importantly, Dubai is a major exporter to Iran and a major re-exporter of Iranian goods. The trade between Iran and Dubai is one of the principal sources of Tehran’s confidence that it can survive US-led sanctions. Iranian investment in Dubai amounts to about US $14 billion each year. US intelligence officials have long suspected that the Iranian government uses Dubai based front companies to get around sanctions.

Some of the banks said to have the largest exposure to Dubai debt have in the past been linked to Iran. Notably, HSBC, BNP Paribas and Standard Chartered came under investigation and pressure from US authorities in recent years to cut ties to Iran. Some US officials have quietly protested that these banks just shifted to doing business with Iran through Dubai. The US may want to see these creditors take losses from their Dubai exposure.

Make no mistake: the US government does not want to see the financial ruin of Dubai. Apart from its ties to Iran, Dubai is widely viewed as a model Islamic country. It has a relatively clean government, and there is a remarkable level of religious tolerance and progressive attitudes toward women for the region. American diplomats have held up Dubai as their model for a new Baghdad—progressive, tolerant, and capitalist.

What is most likely happening is more nuanced. The US and Abu Dhabi are hoping to use Dubai’s financial troubles as a way of finally severing the close ties to Iran. For years, Dubai has enjoyed the benefits of walking the line between its military and economic alliance with the US and economic benefits from banking and trade ties to Iran. The price of a bailout from Abu Dhabi may be having to finally choose to give up the Iran connection.
_______________________________________________________
19 Jan 2010 - Debt may be at US$170b

DUBAI - THE total debt of cash-strapped Dubai could be as much as US$170 billion (S$237 billion), much higher than earlier reported, according to a report by EFG-Hermes regional investment bank.

'The total debt held by Dubai Inc could well be in the range of US$130-170 billion,' the bank said in its 2010 UAE Yearbook, a copy of which was received by AFP on Tuesday.

Dubai Inc is a term used to refer to the Dubai government and its government-related entities. Dubai shook world markets in November when it said it wanted to request a freeze on debt repayments by its largest and most-indebted conglomerate, Dubai World.

At the time, Dubai's total debt, including that of its state firms, was reportedly US$80 billion, with Dubai World owing US$59 billion.

EFG Hermes said it estimated Dubai Inc's capital market debt, including bonds and syndicated loans, to have risen to US$96.6 billion in 2009, including funds raised by the government to meet debt obligations. But it pointed to upside risks, which could take the total debt to US$170 billion, highlighting a lack of data on bilateral loans between Dubai Inc and banks.

'Bilateral lending ... is a bigger concern to us since the scale of lending could be very large and data are practically non-existent,' the bank said. It estimated that the local Emirates NBD bank alone has roughly US$24 billion in bilateral loans to Dubai Inc and also warned that there could be some capital market debt that is unaccounted for. -- AFP

The Hidden Story of the Americans that Finished the Vietnam War - An Excerpt

Photo : Oxymanus
The Hidden Story of the Americans that Finished the Vietnam War

The Soldier’s Revolt - by Joel Geier

Our army that now remains in Vietnam is in a state approaching collapse, with individual units avoiding or having refused combat, murdering their officers and noncommissioned officers, drug-ridden, and dispirited where not near-mutinous Conditions exist among American forces in Vietnam that have only been exceeded in this century by…the collapse of the Tsarist armies in 1916 and 1917.

Armed Forces Journal, June 1971

The most neglected aspect of the Vietnam War is the soldiers’ revolt–the mass upheaval from below that unraveled the American army. It is a great reality check in an era when the U.S. touts itself as an invincible nation. For this reason, the soldiers’ revolt has been written out of official history.

The army revolt pitted enlisted soldiers against officers who viewed them as expendable. Liberal academics have reduced the radicalism of the 1960s to middle-class concerns and activities, while ignoring military rebellion. But the militancy of the 1960s began with the Black liberation struggle, and it reached its climax with the unity of White and Black soldiers.

A working-class army

From 1964 to 1973, from the Gulf of Tonkin resolution to the final withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam, 27 million men came of draft age. A majority of them were not drafted due to college, professional, medical or National Guard deferments. Only 40 percent were drafted and saw military service. A small minority, 2.5 million men (about 10 percent of those eligible for the draft), were sent to Vietnam.

This small minority was almost entirely working-class or rural youth. Their average age was 19. Eighty-five percent of the troops were enlisted men; 15 percent were officers. The enlisted men were drawn from the 80 percent of the armed forces with a high school education or less. At this time, college education was universal in the middle class.

In the elite colleges, the class discrepancy was even more glaring. The upper class did none of the fighting. Of the 1,200 Harvard graduates in 1970, only 2 went to Vietnam, while working-class high schools routinely sent 20 percent, 30 percent of their graduates and more to Vietnam.

College students who were not made officers were usually assigned to noncombat support and service units. High school dropouts were three times more likely to be sent to combat units that did the fighting and took the casualties. Combat infantry soldiers, “the grunts,” were entirely working class. They included a disproportionate number of Black working-class troops. Blacks, who formed 12 percent of the troops, were often 25 percent or more of the combat units.

When college deferments expired, joining the National Guard was a favorite way to get out of serving in Vietnam. During the war, 80 percent of the Guard’s members described themselves as joining to avoid the draft. You needed connections to get in–which was no problem for Dan Quayle, George W. Bush and other draft evaders. In 1968, the Guard had a waiting list of more than 100,000. It had triple the percentage of college graduates that the army did. Blacks made up less than 1.5 percent of the National Guard. In Mississippi, Blacks were 42 percent of the population, but only one Black man served in a Guard of more than 10,000.

The middle-class officers corps

The officer corps was drawn from the 7 percent of troops who were college graduates, or the 13 percent who had one to three years of college. College was to officer as high school was to enlisted man. The officer corps was middle class in composition and managerial in outlook.

Superfluous support officers lived far removed from danger, lounging in rear base camps in luxurious conditions. A few miles away, combat soldiers were experiencing a nightmarish hell. The contrast was too great to allow for confidence–in both the officers and the war–to survive unscathed.

Westmoreland’s solution to the competition for combat command poured gasoline on the fire. He ordered a one-year tour of duty for enlisted men in Vietnam, but only six months for officers. The combat troops hated the class discrimination that put them at twice the risk of their commanders. They grew contemptuous of the officers, whom they saw as raw and dangerously inexperienced in battle.

Even a majority of officers considered Westmoreland’s tour inequality as unethical. Yet they were forced to use short tours to prove themselves for promotion. They were put in situations in which their whole careers depended on what they could accomplish in a brief period, even if it meant taking shortcuts and risks at the expense of the safety of their men–a temptation many could not resist.

The outer limit of six-month commands was often shortened due to promotion, relief, injury or other reasons. The outcome was “revolving-door” commands. As an enlisted man recalled, “During my year in-country I had five second-lieutenant platoon leaders and four company commanders. One CO was pretty good…All the rest were stupid.”

Aggravating this was the contradiction that guaranteed opposition between officers and men in combat. Officer promotions depended on quotas of enemy dead from search-and-destroy missions. Battalion commanders who did not furnish immediate high body counts were threatened with replacement. This was no idle threat–battalion commanders had a 30 to 50 percent chance of being relieved of command. But search-and-destroy missions produced enormous casualties for the infantry soldiers. Officers corrupted by career ambitions would cynically ignore this and draw on the never-ending supply of replacements from the monthly draft quota.

Officer corruption was rife. A Pentagon official writes, “the stench of corruption rose to unprecedented levels during William C. Westmoreland’s command of the American effort in Vietnam.” The CIA protected the poppy fields of Vietnamese officials and flew their heroin out of the country on Air America planes. Officers took notice and followed suit. The major who flew the U.S. ambassador’s private jet was caught smuggling $8 million of heroin on the plane.

The war was fought by NLF troops and peasant auxiliaries who worked the land during the day and fought as soldiers at night. They would attack ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) and American troops and bases or set mines at night, and then disappear back into the countryside during the day. In this form of guerrilla war, there were no fixed targets, no set battlegrounds, and there was no territory to take. With that in mind, the Pentagon designed a counterinsurgency strategy called “search and destroy.” Without fixed battlegrounds, combat success was judged by the number of NLF troops killed–the body count. A somewhat more sophisticated variant was the “kill ratio”–the number of enemy troops killed compared to the number of Americans dead. This “war of attrition” strategy was the basic military plan of the American ruling class in Vietnam.

For each enemy killed, for every body counted, soldiers got three-day passes and officers received medals and promotions. This reduced the war from fighting for “the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese” to no larger purpose than killing. Any Vietnamese killed was put in the body count as a dead enemy soldier, or as the GIs put it, “if it’s dead, it’s Charlie” (“Charlie” was GI slang for the NLF). This was an inevitable outcome of a war against a whole people. Everyone in Vietnam became the enemy–and this encouraged random slaughter. Officers further ordered their men to “kill them even if they try to surrender–we need the body count.” It was an invitation to kill indiscriminately to swell a tally sheet.

Rather than following their officers, many more soldiers had the courage to revolt against barbarism.

Ninety-five percent of combat units were search-and-destroy units. Their mission was to go out into the jungle, hit bases and supply areas, flush out NLF troops and engage them in battle. If the NLF fought back, helicopters would fly in to prevent retreat and unleash massive firepower–bullets, bombs, missiles. The NLF would attempt to avoid this, and battle generally only occurred if the search-and-destroy missions were ambushed. Ground troops became the live bait for the ambush and firefight. GIs referred to search and destroy as “humping the boonies by dangling the bait.”

Without helicopters, search and destroy would not have been possible–and the helicopters were the terrain of the officers. “On board the command and control chopper rode the battalion commander, his aviation-support commander, the artillery-liaison officer, the battalion S-3 and the battalion sergeant major. They circled…high enough to escape random small-arms fire.” The officers directed their firepower on the NLF down below, but while indiscriminately spewing out bombs and napalm, they could not avoid “collateral damage”–hitting their own troops. One-quarter of the American dead in Vietnam was killed by “friendly fire” from the choppers. The officers were out of danger, the “eye in the sky,” while the troops had their “asses in the grass,” open to fire from both the NLF and the choppers.

When the battle was over, the officers and their choppers would fly off to base camps removed from danger while their troops remained out in the field.

Of the 543,000 American troops in Vietnam in 1968, only 14 percent (or 80,000) were combat troops. These 80,000 men took the brunt of the war. They were the weak link, and their disaffection crippled the ability of the world’s largest military to fight. In 1968, 14,592 men–18 percent of combat troops–were killed. An additional 35,000 had serious wounds that required hospitalization. Although not all of the dead and wounded were from combat units, the overwhelming majority were. The majority of combat troops in 1968 were either seriously injured or killed. The number of American casualties in Vietnam was not extreme, but as it was concentrated among the combat troops, it was a virtual massacre. Not to revolt amounted to suicide.

Officers, high in the sky, had few deaths or casualties. The deaths of officers occurred mostly in the lower ranks among lieutenants or captains who led combat platoons or companies. The higher-ranking officers went unharmed. During a decade of war, only one general and eight full colonels died from enemy fire. As one study commissioned by the military concluded, “In Vietnam…the officer corps simply did not die in sufficient numbers or in the presence of their men often enough.”

The slaughter of grunts went on because the officers never found it unacceptable. There was no outcry from the military or political elite, the media or their ruling-class patrons about this aspect of the war, nor is it commented on in almost any history of the war. It is ignored or accepted as a normal part of an unequal world, because the middle and upper class were not in combat in Vietnam and suffered no pain from its butchery. It never would have been tolerated had their class done the fighting. Their premeditated murder of combat troops unleashed class war in the armed forces. The revolt focused on ending search and destroy through all of the means the army had provided as training for these young workers.

Tet–the revolt begins

The Tet Offensive was the turning point of the Vietnam War and the start of open, active soldiers’ rebellion. At the end of January 1968, on Tet, the Vietnamese New Year, the NLF sent 100,000 troops into Saigon and 36 provincial capitals to lead a struggle for the cities. The Tet Offensive was not militarily successful, because of the savagery of the U.S. counterattack. In Saigon alone, American bombs killed 14,000 civilians. The city of Ben Tre became emblematic of the U.S. effort when the major who retook it announced that “to save the city, we had to destroy it.”

Westmoreland and his generals claimed that they were the victors of Tet because they had inflicted so many casualties on the NLF. But to the world, it was clear that the U.S. had politically lost the war in Vietnam. Tet showed that the NLF had the overwhelming support of the Vietnamese population–millions knew of and collaborated with the NLF entry into the cities and no one warned the Americans. The ARVN had turned over whole cities without firing a shot. In some cases, ARVN troops had welcomed the NLF and turned over large weapons supplies. The official rationale for the war, that U.S. troops were there to help the Vietnamese fend off Communist aggression from the North, was no longer believed by anybody. The South Vietnamese government and military were clearly hated by the people.37

Westmoreland’s constant claim that there was “light at the end of the tunnel,” that victory was imminent, was shown to be a lie. Search and destroy was a pipe dream. The NLF did not have to be flushed out of the jungle, it operated everywhere. No place in Vietnam was a safe base for American soldiers when the NLF so decided.

What, then, was the point of this war? Why should American troops fight to defend a regime its own people despised? Soldiers became furious at a government and an officer corps who risked their lives for lies. Throughout the world, Tet and the confidence that American imperialism was weak and would be defeated produced a massive, radical upsurge that makes 1968 famous as the year of revolutionary hope. In the U.S. army, it became the start of the showdown with the officers.

Mutiny

The refusal of an order to advance into combat is an act of mutiny. In time of war, it is the gravest crime in the military code, punishable by death. In Vietnam, mutiny was rampant, the power to punish withered and discipline collapsed as search and destroy was revoked from below.

Until 1967, open defiance of orders was rare and harshly repressed, with sentences of two to ten years for minor infractions. Hostility to search-and-destroy missions took the form of covert combat avoidance, called “sandbagging” by the grunts. A platoon sent out to “hump the boonies” might look for a safe cover from which to file fabricated reports of imaginary activity.

But after Tet, there was a massive shift from combat avoidance to mutiny. One Pentagon official reflected that “mutiny became so common that the army was forced to disguise its frequency by talking instead of ‘combat refusal.’” Combat refusal, one commentator observed, “resembled a strike and occurred when GIs refused, disobeyed, or negotiated an order into combat.”

Acts of mutiny took place on a scale previously only encountered in revolutions. The first mutinies in 1968 were unit and platoon-level rejections of the order to fight. The army recorded 68 such mutinies that year. By 1970, in the 1st Air Cavalry Division alone, there were 35 acts of combat refusal. One military study concluded that combat refusal was “unlike mutinous outbreaks of the past, which were usually sporadic, short-lived events. The progressive unwillingness of American soldiers to fight to the point of open disobedience took place over a four-year period between 1968-71.”

The 1968 combat refusals of individual units expanded to involve whole companies by the next year. The first reported mass mutiny was in the 196th Light Brigade in August 1969. Company A of the 3rd Battalion, down to 60 men from its original 150, had been pushing through Songchang Valley under heavy fire for five days when it refused an order to advance down a perilous mountain slope. Word of the mutiny spread rapidly. The New York Daily News ran a banner headline, “Sir, My Men Refuse To Go.” The GI paper, The Bond, accurately noted, “It was an organized strike…A shaken brass relieved the company commander…but they did not charge the guys with anything. The Brass surrendered to the strength of the organized men.”

This precedent–no court-martial for refusing to obey the order to fight, but the line officer relieved of his command–was the pattern for the rest of the war. Mass insubordination was not punished by an officer corps that lived in fear of its own men. Even the threat of punishment often backfired. In one famous incident, B Company of the 1st Battalion of the 12th Infantry refused an order to proceed into NLF-held territory. When they were threatened with court-martials, other platoons rallied to their support and refused orders to advance until the army backed down.

As the fear of punishment faded, mutinies mushroomed. There were at least ten reported major mutinies, and hundreds of smaller ones. Hanoi’s Vietnam Courier documented 15 important GI rebellions in 1969. At Cu Chi, troops from the 2nd Battalion of the 27th Infantry refused battle orders. The “CBS Evening News” broadcast live a patrol from the 7th Cavalry telling their captain that his order for direct advance against the NLF was nonsense, that it would threaten casualties, and that they would not obey it. Another CBS broadcast televised the mutiny of a rifle company of the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

When Cambodia was invaded in 1970, soldiers from Fire Base Washington conducted a sit-in. They told Up Against the Bulkhead, “We have no business there…we just sat down. Then they promised us we wouldn’t have to go to Cambodia.” Within a week, there were two additional mutinies, as men from the 4th and 8th Infantry refused to board helicopters to Cambodia.

In the invasion of Laos in March 1971, two platoons refused to advance. To prevent the mutiny from spreading, the entire squadron was pulled out of the Laos operation. The captain was relieved of his command, but there was no discipline against the men. When a lieutenant from the 501st Infantry refused his battalion commander’s order to advance his troops, he merely received a suspended sentence.

The decision not to punish men defying the most sacrosanct article of the military code, the disobedience of the order for combat, indicated how much the deterioration of discipline had eroded the power of the officers. The only punishment for most mutinies was to relieve the commanding officer of his duties. Consequently, many commanders would not report that they had lost control of their men. They swept news of mutiny, which would jeopardize their careers, under the rug. As they became quietly complicit, the officer corps lost any remaining moral authority to impose discipline.

For every defiance in combat, there were hundreds of minor acts of insubordination in rear base camps. As one infantry officer reported, “You can’t give orders and expect them to be obeyed.” This democratic upsurge from below was so extensive that discipline was replaced by a new command technique called working it out. Working it out was a form of collective bargaining in which negotiations went on between officers and men to determine orders. Working it out destroyed the authority of the officer corps and gutted the ability of the army to carry out search-and-destroy missions. But the army had no alternative strategy for a guerrilla war against a national liberation movement.

The political impact of the mutiny was felt far beyond Vietnam. As H.R. Haldeman, Nixon’s chief of staff, reflected, “If troops are going to mutiny, you can’t pursue an aggressive policy.” The soldiers’ revolt tied down the global reach of U.S. imperialism.

Fragging

The murder of American officers by their troops was an openly proclaimed goal in Vietnam. As one GI newspaper demanded, “Don’t desert. Go to Vietnam, and kill your commanding officer.” And they did. A new slang term arose to celebrate the execution of officers: fragging. The word came from the fragmentation grenade, which was the weapon of choice because the evidence was destroyed in the act.

In every war, troops kill officers whose incompetence or recklessness threatens the lives of their men. But only in Vietnam did this become pervasive in combat situations and widespread in rear base camps. It was the most well-known aspect of the class struggle inside the army, directed not just at intolerable officers, but at “lifers” as a class. In the soldiers’ revolt, it became accepted practice to paint political slogans on helmets. A popular helmet slogan summed up this mood: “Kill a non-com for Christ.” Fragging was the ransom the ground troops extracted for being used as live bait.

No one knows how many officers were fragged, but after Tet it became epidemic. At least 800 to 1,000 fragging attempts using explosive devices were made. The army reported 126 fraggings in 1969, 271 in 1970 and 333 in 1971, when they stopped keeping count. But in that year, just in the American Division (of My Lai fame), one fragging per week took place. Some military estimates are that fraggings occurred at five times the official rate, while officers of the Judge Advocate General Corps believed that only 10 percent of fraggings were reported. These figures do not include officers who were shot in the back by their men and listed as wounded or killed in action.

Most fraggings resulted in injuries, although “word of the deaths of officers will bring cheers at troop movies or in bivouacs of certain units.” The army admitted that it could not account for how 1,400 officers and noncommissioned officers died. This number, plus the official list of fragging deaths, has been accepted as the unacknowledged army estimate for officers killed by their men. It suggests that 20 to 25 percent–if not more–of all officers killed during the war were killed by enlisted men, not the “enemy.” This figure has no precedent in the history of war.

Soldiers put bounties on officers targeted for fragging. The money, usually between $100 and $1,000, was collected by subscription from among the enlisted men. It was a reward for the soldier who executed the collective decision. The highest bounty for an officer was $10,000, publicly offered by GI Says, a mimeographed bulletin put out in the 101st Airborne Division, for Col. W. Honeycutt, who had ordered the May 1969 attack on Hill 937. The hill had no strategic significance and was immediately abandoned when the battle ended. It became enshrined in GI folklore as Hamburger Hill, because of the 56 men killed and 420 wounded taking it. Despite several fragging attempts, Honeycutt escaped uninjured.

As Vietnam GI argued after Hamburger Hill, “Brass are calling this a tremendous victory. We call it a goddam butcher shop…If you want to die so some lifer can get a promotion, go right ahead. But if you think your life is worth something, you better get yourselves together. If you don’t take care of the lifers, they might damn well take care of you.”

Fraggings were occasionally called off. One lieutenant refused to obey an order to storm a hill during an operation in the Mekong Delta. “His first sergeant later told him that when his men heard him refuse that order, they removed a $350 bounty earlier placed on his head because they thought he was a ‘hard-liner.’”

The motive for most fraggings was not revenge, but to change battle conduct. For this reason, officers were usually warned prior to fraggings. First, a smoke grenade would be left near their beds. Those who did not respond would find a tear-gas grenade or a grenade pin on their bed as a gentle reminder. Finally, the lethal grenade was tossed into the bed of sleeping, inflexible officers. Officers understood the warnings and usually complied, becoming captive to the demands of their men. It was the most practical means of cracking army discipline. The units whose officers responded opted out of search-and-destroy missions.

An Army judge who presided over fragging trials called fragging “the troops’ way of controlling officers,” and added that it was “deadly effective.” He explained, “Captain Steinberg argues that once an officer is intimidated by even the threat of fragging he is useless to the military because he can no longer carry out orders essential to the functioning of the Army. Through intimidation by threats–verbal and written…virtually all officers and NCOs have to take into account the possibility of fragging before giving an order to the men under them.” The fear of fragging affected officers and NCOs far beyond those who were actually involved in fragging incidents.

Officers who survived fragging attempts could not tell which of their men had tried to murder them, or when the men might strike again. They lived in constant fear of future attempts at fragging by unknown soldiers. In Vietnam it was a truism that “everyone was the enemy”: for the lifers, every enlisted man was the enemy. “In parts of Vietnam fragging stirs more fear among officers and NCOs than does the war with ‘Charlie.’”

Counter-fragging by retaliating officers contributed to a war within the war. While 80 percent of fraggings were of officers and NCOs, 20 percent were of enlisted men, as officers sought to kill potential troublemakers or those whom they suspected of planning to frag them. In this civil war within the army, the military police were used to reinstate order. In October 1971, military police air assaulted the Praline mountain signal site to protect an officer who had been the target of repeated fragging attempts. The base was occupied for a week before command was restored.

Fragging undermined the ability of the Green Machine to function as a fighting force. By 1970, “many commanders no longer trusted Blacks or radical whites with weapons except on guard duty or in combat.” In the American Division, fragmentation grenades were not given to troops. In the 440 Signal Battalion, the colonel refused to distribute all arms. As a soldier at Cu Chi told the New York Times, “The American garrisons on the larger bases are virtually disarmed. The lifers have taken the weapons from us and put them under lock and key.” The U.S. army was slowly disarming its own men to prevent the weapons from being aimed at the main enemy: the lifers.

Peace from below–search and avoid

Mutiny and fraggings expressed the anger and bitterness that combat soldiers felt at being used as bait to kill Communists. It forced the troops to reassess who was the real enemy.

In a remarkable letter, 40 combat officers wrote to President Nixon in July 1970 to advise him that “the military, the leadership of this country–are perceived by many soldiers to be almost as much our enemy as the VC and the NVA.

After the 1970 invasion of Cambodia enlarged the war, fury and the demoralizing realization that nothing could stop the warmongers swept both the antiwar movement and the troops. The most popular helmet logo became “UUUU,” which meant “the unwilling, led by the unqualified, doing the unnecessary, for the ungrateful.” Peace, if it were to come, would have to be made by the troops themselves, instituted by an unofficial troop withdrawal ending search-and-destroy missions.

The form this peace from below took came to be called “search and avoid,” or “search and evade.” It became so extensive that “search and evade (meaning tacit avoidance of combat by units in the field) is now virtually a principle of war, vividly expressed by the GI phrase, ‘CYA’ (cover your ass) and get home!”

In search and avoid, patrols sent out into the field deliberately eluded potential clashes with the NLF. Night patrols, the most dangerous, would halt and take up positions a few yards beyond the defense perimeter, where the NLF would never come. By skirting potential conflicts, they hoped to make it clear to the NLF that their unit had established its own peace treaty.

Another frequent search-and-avoid tactic was to leave base camp, secure a safe area in the jungle and set up a perimeter-defense system in which to hole up for the time allotted for the mission. “Some units even took enemy weapons with them when they went out on such search-and-avoid missions so that upon return they could report a firefight and demonstrate evidence of enemy casualties for the body-count figures required by higher headquarters.”

The army was forced to accommodate what began to be called “the grunts’ cease-fire.” An American soldier from Cu Chi, quoted in the New York Times, said, “They have set up separate companies for men who refuse to go out into the field. It is no big thing to refuse to go. If a man is ordered to go to such and such a place, he no longer goes through the hassle of refusing; he just packs his shirt and goes to visit some buddies at another base camp.”

An observer at Pace, near the Cambodian front where a unilateral truce was widely enforced, reported, “The men agreed and passed the word to other platoons: nobody fires unless fired upon. As of about 1100 hours on October 10,1971, the men of Bravo Company, 11/12 First Cav Division, declared their own private cease-fire with the North Vietnamese.”

The NLF responded to the new situation. People’s Press, a GI paper, in its June 1971 issue claimed that NLF and NVA units were ordered not to open hostilities against U.S. troops wearing red bandanas or peace signs, unless first fired upon. Two months later, the first Vietnam veteran to visit Hanoi was given a copy of “an order to North Vietnamese troops not to shoot U.S. soldiers wearing antiwar symbols or carrying their rifles pointed down.” He reports its impact on “convincing me that I was on the side of the Vietnamese now.”

Colonel Heinl reported this:

That ’search-and-evade’ has not gone unnoticed by the enemy is underscored by the Viet Cong delegation’s recent statement at the Paris Peace Talks that Communist units in Indochina have been ordered not to engage American units which do not molest them. The same statement boasted–not without foundation in fact–that American defectors are in the VC ranks.

Some officers joined, or led their men, in the unofficial cease-fire from below. A U.S. army colonel claimed:

I had influence over an entire province. I put my men to work helping with the harvest. They put up buildings. Once the NVA understood what I was doing, they eased up. I’m talking to you about a de facto truce, you understand. The war stopped in most of the province. It’s the kind of history that doesn’t get recorded. Few people even know it happened, and no one will ever admit that it happened.

Search and avoid, mutiny and fraggings were a brilliant success. Two years into the soldiers’ upsurge, in 1970, the number of U.S. combat deaths were down by more than 70 percent (to 3,946) from the 1968 high of more than 14,000. The revolt of the soldiers in order to survive and not to allow themselves to be victims could only succeed by a struggle prepared to use any means necessary to achieve peace from below.

The army revolt had all of the strengths and weaknesses of the 1960s radicalization of which it was a part. It was a courageous mass struggle from below. It relied upon no one but itself to win its battles.

The only organizing tools were the underground GI newspapers. But newspapers became a substitute for organization.

The hidden history of the 1960s proves that the American army can be split. But that requires the long, slow patient work of explanation, of education, of organization, and of agitation and action. The Vietnam revolt shows how rank-and-file soldiers can rise to the task.

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Thursday, Jan. 7, 2010

READERS IN COUNCIL - An Excerpt

Civilian death toll in Iraq war

By JAMES CORBETT
Okayama, Japan

In his Jan. 3 letter, "Unbelievable case against Blair," Paul Middleton seems to hinge his defense of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair (whom Gwynne Dyer criticized in his Dec. 22 article, "Travails of a 'young war criminal' ") on Dyer's offhand remark that "at least 100,000 people died" as a result of the invasion. As much as Middleton would wish this not to be so, such figures are not merely a matter of opinion.

The latest Project Censored list of the top 25 censored news stories of 2009 is topped by the remarkable fact that more than 1 million deaths of Iraqi civilians are directly attributable to the U.S.-British led invasion begun in March 2003. This tally is garnered from research conducted by a prestigious British polling group, and serves to further confirm figures from a scientific study published in Lancet, one of the world's premiere medical journals, in 2006. Remarkably, this research indicates that U.S. forces alone may have been responsible for the deaths of more than 10,000 Iraqis every month as a direct result of their operations to "free the majority of the Iraqi people and stabilize the region," as Middleton puts it.

While I find it unfortunate that Middleton would attempt to refute Dyer's facts without citing any sources, I cannot hold him accountable for being so misinformed about the true horror of the Iraqi invasion and its aftermath. The very purpose of Project Censored's annual list is to draw attention to those news stories that are given short shrift — or sometimes actively buried — by corporate media with vested interests in supporting the ongoing conflict and suppressing uncomfortable truths.

Perhaps the most disturbing point of all is that the debate has become one of numbers and that we now run the risk of losing sight of the fact that what we are talking about are not digits or statistics, but the lives of mothers, fathers, sisters and brothers who will never again see the light of day.
The opinions expressed in this letter to the editor are the writer's own and do not necessarily reflect the policies of The Japan Times.

Protests planned for Hawaii's 50th anniversary – An Excerpt

Protests planned for Hawaii's 50th anniversary – An Excerpt

HONOLULU – Protesters will march the streets and Hawaiian chants will echo from the sprawling lawn of Iolani Palace on Hawaii's 50th anniversary of statehood, as high-minded panelists ponder the islands' future at a daylong conference.

While lacking much in the way of public parties or parades, Hawaii's official statehood day festivities will feature entertainment by local musicians and panel discussions emphasizing tourism's future, alternative energy and Native Hawaiian rights.

About 1,000 demonstrators who would rather see Hawaii's independence restored are expected to rally outside the conference at the Hawaii Convention Center.

"We want to show how U.S. imperialism has spread across the Pacific and across the world," said Lynette Cruz, an organizer of the Hawaiian Independence Action Alliance. "It'll be fun."

The protesters will be allowed inside the convention center lobby, but they can't get into the individual conference rooms without purchasing a $30 ticket.

"We're trying to set a standard that embraces dialogue over physical conflict, and that's the hope for Friday," said Trisha Kehaulani Watson of Honua Consulting, one of the Hawaiian panelists. "We can show people that we can have concerns and be emotional without losing control."

Previous statehood anniversaries haven't always been peaceful.

American-flag-waving Statehood Day celebrants and Hawaiian sovereignty advocates clashed in 2006 at Iolani Palace, the heart of the Hawaiian monarchy where officials declared in 1959 that Hawaii had joined the union. The conflict turned into a shouting match between those trying to sing "The Star-Spangled Banner" and others who used a public address system to drown them out.

Last year, police arrested 23 members of a Hawaiian pro-sovereignty group that broke into the palace, locked its gates and posted signs that read, "Property of the Kingdom of Hawaiian Trust."

"The state is very cognizant of Hawaiian protests, and I think they don't want to have any bad press," said Dean Saranillio, a student who wrote his dissertation on how statehood came at the expense of Hawaiian self-determination. "There's a very vibrant and vocal Hawaiian community that's well-versed in the history. They know statehood was a product of the overthrow."

The Hawaiian kingdom was overthrown in 1893 when a group of white businessmen forced Queen Liliuokalani to abdicate while U.S. Marines came ashore.

About 94 percent of Hawaii voters supported statehood in 1959, but opponents argue the vote was tainted because the only choice on the ballot was to become a state or remain a territory — independence was not an option.

At sunset Friday, 18 Hawaiians will recite chants in memory of Queen Liliuokalani from the balconies of Iolani Palace, said Kippen de Alba Chu, chairman of the Statehood Commission. He said the chanters and the conference discussions will help set the stage for Hawaii's future.

"The tone is reflective. We're looking back where we came from and looking at our accomplishments, but perhaps also the things we need to do better," he said.

Back at the convention center, Hawaii's commemorative 50th anniversary postage stamp will be unveiled. The stamp, available nationwide Friday, will show a painting of a longboard surfer and two paddlers on an outrigger canoe.

The day's events will end with a '50s-style concert by The Platters, the Coasters and the Drifters.

Other statehood events included a walking tour focused on the overthrow, with costumed guides and role-players along the way; a statehood mosaic unveiled earlier this month at the Honolulu airport with artwork from more than 8,000 students nationwide; TV and radio ads with "50 Voices of Statehood" interviews; and 50 time capsules buried around the state to be opened on the state's 75th anniversary in 2034.

State lawmakers allocated $600,000 for statehood events.
_____________________________________________________________________________________


Hawaii keeps 50th anniversary low key amid cultural concerns
By: MARK NIESSE - Associated Press, August 16, 2009


HONOLULU — Hawaii turns 50 years old as the 50th state Friday, but there will be no grand parades, no dazzling fireworks, no lavish displays of native culture.

Organizers of the observation are not even willing to call it a party. It is simply a "commemoration," one that is sensitive to a painful history of the Hawaiian monarchy's overthrow and unresolved claims of Native Hawaiians.

The main event is a low-key daylong conference reflecting on Hawaii's place in the world. Behind the tourist-friendly tropical images of beaches and sunshine, many remain uncomfortable with the U.S. takeover of the islands and the idea that businesses have exploited Hawaiians' culture.

"Instead of state government having huge parties and fireworks, we're having a convention," said Manu Boyd, cultural director for the Royal Hawaiian Center, a shopping and entertainment area in Waikiki. "That shows the strength and spiritual power of the Hawaiian people, whose shattered world has not yet been addressed."

When statehood came calling in 1959, it ushered in an era of economic prosperity through tourism and the side effects that came with it: resort high rises, more than 500,000 monthly tourists and an emphasis on hokey luaus rather than the authentic host culture.

Sovereignty groups advocating independence from the United States make up a minority, but many residents recognize the long-standing issues associated with the 1893 overthrow of the monarchy, the islands' annexation and past harms to the Native Hawaiian people.

Dodie Brown was a smiling 6-year-old when her father took a picture of her holding a newspaper proclaiming "Statehood!" — an image that traveled around the world.

"It's good that the commemoration is quiet," said Brown, who now works for the city of Honolulu. "Something like this should be done with taste and finesse, in respect to everyone's feelings."

Besides the statehood conference, the Hawaii Statehood Commission has been airing TV and radio ads with "50 Voices of Statehood" interviews, inviting schools to place commemorative items in time capsules, displaying artwork on the meaning of statehood in the Hawaii Convention Center and showing exhibits in state airports. State lawmakers allocated $600,000 for statehood events.

"Out of respect, we decided not to do the parade and the big party," said Kippen de Alba Chu, chairman of the Statehoood Commission. Those kinds of events "would have been a waste of state funds, especially given the economy."

Alaska, by contrast, which joined the union in January, 1959, embraced the 50th anniversary of statehood with concerts, fireworks displays, a prize-winning float in California's Rose Parade and observances throughout the state during the past 12 months. Among the festivities celebrated in a downtown Anchorage festival was the re-enactment of placing the 49th star on the American flag.

Here, even the low-key conference is drawing complaints. Hawaiian sovereignty groups are planning protests outside the convention center Friday, and some say the conference's topics are too focused on tourism, economic development and business opportunities.

One panelist, University of Hawaii Center for Hawaiian Studies professor Jonathan Osorio, said the conference should focus more on Hawaiian culture and history.

"It's a political cop-out because the state doesn't really want to address the legal or political nature of its claim to authority in Hawaii," Osorio said. "It's one of the reasons they have really muted its commemoration."

Nearly 18 years after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor pulled the United States into World War II, Hawaii was admitted into the United States on Aug. 21, 1959.

About 94 percent of island chain's voters supported statehood. Opponents argue that the vote was tainted because the only choice on the ballot was to become a state or remain a territory — independence was not an option.

The Hawaiian kingdom was overthrown in 1893 when a group of white businessmen forced Queen Liliuokalani to abdicate while U.S. Marines came ashore. Hawaii was considered a republic until it became a U.S. territory by a resolution approved by Congress in 1898.

"This newfangled idea of celebrating statehood shows that people don't understand Hawaii's history, or if they do understand, then they're celebrating a lie, a theft, that essentially stole a people's right of self-determination," said Poka Laenui, a Hawaiian and attorney who has worked for independence for more than 30 years.

Along with statehood came striking changes to the islands, as the first commercial jetliner's arrival in Honolulu just a few weeks earlier began the dawn of the tourism era. Today, Hawaii's economy depends on tourism as its primary industry, with nearly 7 million visiting the islands in 2008.

Hawaii's image as a beach paradise captured the imagination of the rest of the world, aided by sometimes irreverent marketing of hula girls, leis or tiki torch-lit hotels.

In recent years, the tourism industry has made strides in ensuring the Hawaiian culture is respected rather than exploited, said Kelii Wilson, Hawaiian cultural coordinator for the Hawaii Tourism Authority.

For example, businesses should ensure that Tahitian dancers aren't called Hawaiian hula dancers, and that Hawaiian words are pronounced and spelled correctly, Wilson said.

"Growing up as a child here in Hawaii, I did see misrepresentations of the culture," she said. "Now we're getting closer to the right place."

One way Hawaiians are moving toward having a voice in their self-determination is through legislation pending in Congress that would treat them similarly to Native American tribes and Alaskan natives.

After a decade of efforts, the measure could pass into law as soon as this year with the support of Hawaii-born President Barack Obama.

The US growing interest in Southeast Asia

The US growing interest in Southeast Asia

Anak Agung Banyu Perwita , Jakarta | Thu, 07/30/2009 9:42 AM | Opinion ( Jakarta Post Excerpt )

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) last week. The formal establishment of this friendship treaty with the United States marks a new chapter in US-ASEAN relations.

Although relations between ASEAN and the US have no doubt been largely positive for both sides, the shift in US foreign policy regarding the region will no doubt impact future relations.

Even though many analysts have argued that Southeast Asia has enjoyed an environment of relative stability, it does not necessarily mean the region has been free from potential conflict. There are still many problems which have the potential to trigger an escalation of the complex pattern of relations among the members and non members of ASEAN. In other words, ASEAN should maintain its strategic opportunities by working well both internally and internationally.

In the wake of Sept. 11, 2001, the US found itself in a paradoxical position with Southeast Asia and, more specifically, with ASEAN. On the one hand, relations with several ASEAN member states have expanded significantly with the US-led global war against terrorism and because of a new appreciation in Washington of China’s rise in the region.

These two factors sparked a modest renaissance in US bilateral relations with ASEAN. Washington found new common cause with Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Manila in initiatives to strengthen anti-terrorism measures which included intelligence sharing, joint surveillance and police training.

However, critics make two arguments that detract from this claim. First, the global war against terrorism has created a backlash, particularly in Muslim areas of Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia.

Surveys suggest that the image of the United States in the region’s domestic populations has fallen significantly since the promulgation of the Bush doctrine and the beginning of the Iraq War. The post 9/11 era has diminished the power of state-centered political and military rivalry to dominate international relations.

On the other hand, many non-state actors now have a more significant global influence. There is also a process of reconfiguring power through which international security relationships are channeled.

A second argument holds that China has increased its political, economic, and security presence in Southeast Asia. US counter-terrorism policy has indirectly helped Beijing to deepen its engagement in smaller, poorer Southeast Asian countries where Islamic radicalism is not a major problem such as Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos.

The growing number of external powers seeking closer ties with Southeast Asia – Japan, Australia, India, Russia, the EU, as well as China – has led analysts on both sides of the Pacific to worry that the US presence in the region is diluted by default. A more specific concern is that a regional architecture is emerging which could weaken US power in the region, if not now then at some point in the future.

While there are no major problems that threaten the relations between ASEAN and the US in the near future, the lack of trust will lead to serious problem in the long term. Amid the rise of China as regional power, both ASEAN and the US have to make a greater effort to trust each other. They cannot take their common interests for granted. The common interests of containing communism during the Cold War and now in combating terrorism have no doubt brought the two parties together.

Secretary Clinton stated that a greater engagement with ASEAN is pivotal for the US. Further, US Ambassador to ASEAN Scot Marciel argued that the US also wants ASEAN “to remain strong and independent, enjoy peace, stability, ensure growing prosperity and greater freedom, achieve their goals for integration and [for the US] to work in partnership with ASEAN on bilateral, regional and global issues”.

Long lasting cooperation can only be built upon a more important foundation than simple interests. Trust and shared norms are essential if long lasting relationships are to be maintained. Unfortunately, so far, ASEAN-US relations have not reached a phase where trust and shared norms rule.


The writer is a Professor of International Relations at Parahyangan Catholic University and is Director of the Division of Global Affairs at the Indonesia Institute of Strategic Studies, Jakarta.

They Came, They Conquered, They Blundered

June 30, 2009
CNN Poll: Americans overwhelming support moving US combat troops out of Iraqi cities
Posted: 05:30 AM ET

From CNN Deputy Political Director Paul Steinhauser

WASHINGTON (CNN) –A new national poll suggests that nearly three-quarters of all Americans support the plan to withdraw most U.S. combat troops from Iraqi cities and towns, even though most believe that the troop movements will lead to an increase in violence in that country.

The CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll released on Tuesday morning comes on the same day as the long-anticipated deadline for American troops to pull out of Iraqi towns and cities. The U.S. military has been gradually moving its combat troops out of Iraq's population centers for months to meet the deadline agreed by Washington and Baghdad. Since January the Americans have handed over or shut down more than 150 bases across the country, leaving U.S. troops in a little over 300 locations in Iraq that will gradually be handed over to Iraqi control. The Iraqi government describes Tuesday's pullout as National Sovereignty Day."

Seventy-three percent of Americans questioned in the poll favor the withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraqi cities and towns, with 26 percent opposed.

"This plan has widespread bipartisan support," says CNN Polling Director Keating Holland. "Seventy two percent of Democrats and 74 percent of Republicans favor this move."

The poll indicates that 52 percent think the level of violence in Iraqi cities will increase after U.S. troops withdraw, with 32 percent saying things will remain the same and 15 percent feeling that the level of violence will decrease. If violence does increase, the poll suggests Americans are quite clear about how to respond.

"Nearly two-thirds say that the U.S. should not send combat troops back into Iraqi population centers even if there is a significant increase in the number of violence attacks." Holland notes. "Americans seem to believe that once the Iraqis are in charge, it's up to them to solve any future problems."

The overall war in Iraq remains unpopular, with only about a third the public supporting the U.S. war in that country.

The CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll was conducted Friday through Sunday, with 1,026 adult Americans questioned by telephone. The survey's sampling error is plus or minus three percentage points.

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POLITICS: Why Did the U.S. Invade Iraq?
Analysis by Jim Lobe*

WASHINGTON, Mar 18 (IPS) - So why, exactly, did the U.S. invade Iraq five years ago this week?

The official reasons - the threat posed to the U.S. and its allies by Saddam Hussein's alleged programmes of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the possibility that he would pass along those arms to al Qaeda - have long since been discarded by the overwhelming weight of the evidence, or, more precisely, the lack of evidence that such a threat ever existed.

Liberating Iraq from the tyranny of Hussein's particularly unforgiving and bloodthirsty version of Ba'athism and thus setting an irresistible precedent that would spread throughout the Arab world - a theme pushed by the administration of President George W. Bush mostly after the invasion, as it became clear that the officials reasons could not be justified - appears to have been the guiding obsession of really only one member of the Bush team, and not a particularly influential one at that: Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz.

Then there's the theory that Bush - whose enigmatic psychology, particularly his relationship to his father, has already provided grist for several book-publishing mills - wanted to show up his dad for failing to take Baghdad in 1991. Or he sought to "finish the job" that his dad had begun in 1991; and/or avenge his dad for Hussein's alleged (but highly questionable) assassination attempt against Bush I in Kuwait after the war.

Because Bush was the ultimate "Decider", as he himself has put it, and because no one who ever served at top levels in the administration has ever been able to say precisely when (let alone why) the decision was made to invade Iraq, this explanation cannot be entirely dismissed as an answer.

Then there is the question of oil. Was the administration acting on behalf of an oil industry desperate to get its hands on Mesopotamian oil that had long been denied it as a result of U.N. and unilateral sanctions prohibiting business between U.S. companies and Hussein?

Given both Bush's and Vice President Dick Cheney's long-standing ties to the industry and former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan's assertion in his recent memoir that "The Iraq war is largely about oil," this theory has definite appeal - particularly to those on the left who made "No Blood for Oil" a favourite mantra at anti-war protests in the run-up to the invasion, just as they did - with much greater plausibility - before the 1991 Gulf War.

The problem, however, is that there is little or no evidence that Big Oil, an extremely cautious beast in the global corporate menagerie, favoured a war, particularly one carried out in a way (unilaterally) that risked destabilising the world's most oil-rich region, especially Saudi Arabia and the emirates.

On the contrary, the Rice University Institute that bears the name of former Secretary of State James Baker - a man who has both represented and embodied Big Oil throughout his long legal career - publicly warned early on that if Bush absolutely, positively had to invade Iraq for whatever reason, he should not even consider it unless two conditions were met: 1) that the action was authorised by the U.N. Security Council; and 2) that nothing whatever be done after the invasion to suggest that the motivation had to do with the acquisition by U.S. oil companies of Iraq's oil resources.

That is not to say that oil was irrelevant to the administration's calculations, but perhaps in a different sense than that meant by the "No Blood for Oil" slogan. After all, oil is an absolutely indispensable requirement for running modern economies and militaries. And the invasion was a forceful - indeed, a shock- and awe-some - demonstration to the rest of the world, especially potential strategic rivals like China, Russia, or even the European Union, of Washington's ability to quickly and effectively conquer and control an oil-rich nation in the heart of the energy-rich Middle East/Gulf region any time it wishes, perhaps persuading those lesser powers that challenging the U.S. could well prove counter-productive to long-term interests, if not their supply of energy in the short term.

Indeed, a demonstration of such power could well be the fastest way to formalise a new international order based on the overwhelming military power of the United States, unequalled at least since the Roman Empire. It would be a "unipolar world" of the kind envisaged by the 1992 draft Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) commissioned by then-Pentagon chief Dick Cheney, overseen by Wolfowitz and Cheney's future chief of staff, I. Lewis Libby, and contributed to by future ambassador to "liberated" Afghanistan and Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad and Bush's deputy national security adviser, J.D. Crouch.

It was that same vision that formed the inspiration for the 27 charter signatories - a coalition of aggressive nationalists, neo-conservatives, and Christian Right leaders that included Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Libby, Khalilzad, and several other future senior Bush administration national-security officials - of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) in 1997. It was the same project that began calling for "regime change" in Iraq in 1998 and that, nine days after the 9/11 attack on New York and the Pentagon, publicly warned that any "war on terror" that excluded Hussein's elimination would necessarily be incomplete.

In retrospect, it seems clear that Iraq had long been seen by this group, which became empowered first by Bush's election and then super-charged by 9/11, as the first, easiest and most available step toward achieving a "Pax Americana" that would not only establish the U.S. once and for all as the dominant power in the region, but whose geo-strategic implications for aspiring "peer competitors" would be global in scope.

For the neo-conservative and the Christian Right members of this group, who were its most eager and ubiquitous war boosters, Israel would also be a major beneficiary of an invasion.

According to a 1996 paper drafted by prominent hard-line neo-conservatives - including some, like Douglas Feith and David Wurmser, who would later serve in senior posts in Cheney's office and the Pentagon in the run-up to the invasion - ousting Hussein and installing a pro-Western leader was the key to destabilising Israel's Arab enemies and/or bending them to its will. This would permit the Jewish state not only to escape the Oslo peace process, but also to secure as much of the occupied Palestinian (and Syrian) territories as it wished.

Indeed, getting rid of Hussein and occupying Iraq would not only tighten Israel's hold on Arab territories, in this view; it could also threaten the survival of the Arab and Islamic worlds' most formidable weapon against Israel - OPEC - by flooding the world market with Iraqi oil and forcing the commodity's price down to historic lows.

That's how it looked five years ago anyway.

(*Jim Lobe's blog on U.S. foreign policy, and particularly the neo-conservative influence in the Bush administration, can be read at http://www.ips.org/blog/jimlobe/.) (END/2008)

U.S. Military Presence in Mainland Japan and Okinawa

U.S. Military Presence in Mainland Japan and Okinawa

Ichiyo Muto (People’s Plan Study Groups)- An Excerpt

There are approximately 90 U.S. military facilities including major military bases throughout mainland Japan and Okinawa, with an area total of 3,130,000 sq.meters, 75% of which are in Okinawa. They are concentrated in a few areas (prefectures), 37 in Okinawa, 15 in Kanagawa, 11 in Nagasaki, and 7 in Tokyo. About 52,000 U.S. troops are stationed in these bases, 26,000 in mailand and 25,000 in Okinawa (2001). In mainland Japan, the largest contingent is the air force with 6,600 and that in Okinawa marines (15,500).

The U.S. armed forces in Japan, together with U.S. forces in South Korea, are subjected to the Pacific Command located in Hawaii though the Command located at Yokota Airbase in Tokyo also functions as an auxiliary command for the forces deployed all over Japan. The forces deployed to Japan are not a separate complete military unit but integral part of the Pacific Force as the largest of the four U.S. joint forces with a vast jurisdiction extending from the U.S. western coast and the whole of the Pacific Ocean through the Indian Ocean to the eastern coasts of Africa.

The main U.S. bases in mainland Japan include Misawa airbase in Aomori Prefecture up in the north of Honshu Island, Yokota Airbase in Tokyo, Yokosuka naval base in Kanagawa Prefecture, Atsugi base in the same prefecture, Iwakuni marine base near Hiroshima, and Sasebo naval base in Nagasaki Prefecture. Also there are munitions depots, communication bases, port facilities, warehouses, military barracks, residential estates.


1960 Security Treaty and SOFA

Defeating Japan in WWII in 1945, the United States, placed Japan under occupation, took over Japanese military bases and used them as the frontline bases of the Cold War. These bases were intensely used in the 1950-53 Korean War as the attack posts in the immediate rear of the war front. The U.S. in the first years of occupation wanted to demilitarize Japan as its potential military adversary and drafted the postwar pacifist Constitution which was welcomed by Japanese people, but it reversed its policy by 1950 and ordered remilitarization and created a “police reserve force” that later developed into the world’s budgetary second largest Self-Defense Forces.

The U.S. placed Okinawa under its direct military rule, willfully confiscated Okinawan people’s land for construction of huge strategic bases in main island of Okinawa and nearby Iejima Island, centering on the Kadena airfield.

In 1951, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed, ending occupation for mainland Japan in 1952, but that treaty separated Okinawa from Japanese sovereignty and surrendered it to U.S. military rule. Okinawa remained U.S. military colony until 1972 when it was “reverted” to Japan.

Simultaneously with the peace treaty, another treaty called Japan-U.S. security treaty was signed, allowing continued presence of U.S military forces in the Japanese territory. U.S. continued to hold and freely use the bases secured under occupation.

The 1952 security treaty was revised in 1960 into a treaty of relatively bilateral nature, to jointly meet armed attacks at either party and for security in the Far East. The treaty stated, “for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States is granted the use of its land, air, and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.” This treaty is up to now the legal ground of the stationing of U.S. forces and U.S. use of bases in Japan. Simultaneously with the security treaty, the status of force agreement was made, giving privileges and prerogatives to the U.S. military personnel and use of Japanese facilities.

Though SOFA states that the U.S. bears all expenditures incurred by the maintenance of U.S. armed forces in Japan, the Japanese government since 1987 began to meet increasing portions of U.S. costs, reaching more than $6 billion in 2001 in “host nation support.”


Anti-Base Movements

During and immediately after the occupation, expansion of U.S. military bases was met by vigorous opposition movements of local communities with the national support of progressive movements such as students’ and workers. The movements successfully prevented base expansion or base area enclosure in most major cases (Uchinada, Myogi, Tachikawa, all in the 1950s). Local farmers’ opposition movement to U.S. and Japanese live shelling exercises on the skirts of Mt. Fuji, begun in the 1950s, still continues.

The 1960 struggle against the conclusion of the revised security treaty was the largest national political struggle against military ties with the U.S. and all anti-base movements participated in it.

During the Vietnam War period, new peace and anti-war movements grew rapidly, and their action was frequently targeted against U.S. military bases, in many cases through direct action. The best known is the whole community action against U.S. Sagamihara weapons depot from which tanks were being transported to Vietnam. Students’ and citizens’ movements massively mobilized in this period to protest the entry of U.S. aircraft carriers, deployment of new weapons (Tomahawk missiles etc.)

After the Vietnam War ended, anti-base movement has been sustained mainly by local action groups around the base areas, which are loosely networked across the country and working to support Okinawa people’s anti-base struggles. The forms and styles of action are manifold and wide-ranged. Aside from general mobilization and street demonstration on the issues of bases, some of the collective action styles include:

- Monitoring the activities of the base such as troops movement on a daily basis and reporting to the community and other anti-base groups (e.g. Yokota airbase, extremely low altitude flights monitored by widespread networks)

- Demonstrating, picketing, over particular action of the U.S. military, most typically activists riding rubber boats demonstrate at sea against entry and/or departure of U.S. fleet on combat missions (e.g. Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo)

- Conducting sustained campaigns of local community groups, including litigation, against particular hazards such as noise and pollution (Atsugi base by groups in Yamato city)

- Community-wide sustained campaigns opposing new U.S. base-related projects, using local elections (Zushi city community opposing the construction of U.S. military housing estate at the cost of national preserve; local movement elected opposition mayors)

- Using powers of local autonomy to restrict free use of facilities by U.S. military (most typically the Kobe formula – Kobe municipality bans entry of ships into Kobe port unless they previous present no-nuclear weapon certificates; because of this system, no U.S. warships have been able to enter the port so far).

- Filing lawsuits about the unconstitutionality of Japan’s “host nation support” for U.S. military (Tokyo and Osaka);

- Ad placing campaigns on issues of bases, military exercises, withdrawal U.S. marines (Yufuin group’s ad in New York Times etc.)


=== People’s Plan Study Group ===

Address: Sunrise Shinjyuku 3F, 2-4-15 Okubo, Shinjyuku-ku, Tokyo 169-0072 JAPAN

_____________________________________________________________________________________


U.S Bases in Okinawa

Masahiro Shimada (Anti-War Landowners’ Association for the Protection of Rights and Properties)


1. Overall Picture−Its History

　Okinawa is an archipelago located between Taiwan and Japan. It consists of some 160 islands extended in an area of 400 km. from south to north and 1,000 km from east to west. Of these 160 islands, 49 are inhabited with the population of 130 million. The subtropical climate makes Okinawa a pleasant place to live with flowers all round the year. Okinawa was invaded in 1609 by a feudal Japanese clan ruling Satsuma in Kyushu. In the following 400 years, Okinawa tried to survive while threatened by the vested interests of the big nation. Now Japan imposes area-wise 75% of the US bases it hosts on Okinawa, which is only 0.6% of its territory. The reality is an eloquent expression of the marginalization of Okinawa by Japan and the colonial relationships on it maintained by Japan and the US. At present, plans are being carried out to construct yet new bases (Henoko Marine Base, the transfer of Naha Naval Base to Urasoe Port (for capacity expansion), and facilities for training for urban hostilities). This is causing Okinawa people’s anger.


Battle of Okinawa

The battle of Okinawa was the last ground battle fought between the US Forces and Japanese Armed Forces. After intense air raids and shelling from warships, US Forces began landing from the Kerama Islands in the west of the Main Island in late March, 1945. Thus “the hell of hells” as described by the US Troops began. The 110,000 Japanese troops including the 35,000 untrained recruiters assigned to defend Okinawa with poor weapons had to cope with the U.S. force of 540,000 with overwhelmingly superiority. 180,000 US soldiers landed on Okinawa and began the battle that destroyed every single thing on the island during the subsequent three months. With this “Iron Typhoon” more than 200,000 soldiers and civilians died including one quarter of the Okinawa population.,US casualties counted 12,000. The US Forces began constructing new bases on the island in order to prepare the attack on the Main Island of Japan. This was the beginning of the US program of using Okinawa as its forward base for the containment of the spread of communism. But bases and buildings constructed in the initial perid of US occupation were simple and provisional.

　

Construction of Permanent Bases

In the 1950s, the construction of permanent bases began with a special budget earmarked for the purpose. In 1952, San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed simultaneously with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In return for Japan’s independence, the U.S. placed the archipelago south of Amami Oshima Island under its administration. In 1953, the Amami Islands were returned to Japan but Ryukyus were retained under U.S. administration, and Okinawa was left with the US bases all over it. The establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea alarmed the US as signs of rapid expansion of communism in Asia. The Cold War accelerated the consolidation of the bases in Okinawa. This also signaled yet another beginning of the history of sufferings of the people of Okinawa.


Confiscation of land (the Whole Island Struggle)

　The outbreak of the Korean War further drove the US Forces to construct new bases. Though the US had practically converted the whole island into one big base, the Korean War urged the US to construct stronger forward bases to control the whole of Asia. People of Okinawa who had barely recuperated from the “Iron Typhoon” had to face another typhoon. Land confiscation began in a village called Isahama and spread all over. In some cases the US prohibited farming under the excuse of mosquito outbreak. The paddy fields and farms carefully cultivated were bulldozed before harvesting. At Isahama, at dawn fully armed soldiers arrived with bulldozers and filled fields with sand from the ocean. The green rice plants were buried in salt water and sand. People who were not allowed to harvest resisted but in vain. In Iejima, several American soldiers entered a house and asked for matches to set fire and the house was burnt while the residents did not have time to take their belongings out. People deprived of their basic rights to live went around the island asking for support. Their action was dubbed “Beggars’ March” as the marchers had nothing at all to own and suffered from a terrible inhuman situation. Some of the dislocated people, after moving from place to place in the island, migrated to South America. The land confiscation begun during the Korean War continued to the Vietnam War. The period was characterized as the period of people’s struggle for land.

U.S Rule of Okinawa

The presence of the US bases was the only problem Okinawa suffered from. The US military controlled judiciary, legislature, administration and economy, and that enabled the U.S. to arbitrarily confiscate people’s land. Okinawa did not have its own jurisdiction. The US owned the majority of share of banks and electricity. The governor, the supreme administrator, was appointed by the US Force. In June, 1945, after the Battle of Okinawa ended with the extermination of the Okinawa Garrison, the US Navy began ruling Okinawa. In July, 1946, the US Army took the navy government over. With a view to introducing an American style democratic governance to replace Japan’s emperor system, the U.S. held in September, 1945, elections of mayors and city councils. Woman suffrage was recognized. The army government lasted till 1950 when USCAR （US Administration of Ryukyu Islands）was set up. With this, the policy to construct bases was intensified. USCAR arbitrarily created legal systems to forcefully confiscate land. Their highhandedness caused much anger and protest from the people. Anti US sentiment spread all over the island. To handle this situation, the US introduced a high commissioner system to rule Okinawa. This system lasted until 1972 when Okinawa was returned to Japan. The last high commissioner was the sixth. The economic system of Okinawa became totally dependent on the bases. In 1958 the currency was changed to US dollars. Till then, the currency was B-yen which was a kind of military scrip.

2. Return of the Bases

　For its size and functions the US bases in Okinawa are a monster in Asia. In 1945, the bases were meant to attack Japan. With the rise of socialist states, the bases became a stronghold against communism. They were forward assault bases during the Korean War. During the Vietnam War, Okinawa served as a crucial forward supply base. This is what Okinawa was till 1972. With the demand of each situation and reality, the bases in Okinawa changed its functions provided with new equipment, facilities and new deployment of military personnel. During the war against Japan, the only task needed was to fix the existing airfields to fly B29 bombers to the mainland. Much energy was spent to handle the civilian population, many of them taken as prisoners of war. With the rise of the People’s Republics of China and North Korea, the circumstances changed. Bases were strengthened as an anti-Communist stronghold, accompanied by adjustment of functions in terms of equipment and force posting. Nuclear weapons, ground-to-air missiles, new communication systems, and fighter plane squadrons were introduced. The army intensified tank trainings and live test-shelling of Nike ground-to-air missiles targeting China was also conducted. Under the heavy impact of the Korean War, plans to construct stronger bases were energetically pressed forward.

While the USCAR wanted to get its American style democracy accepted in Okinawa, the people did not swallow it, but on the contrary intensified their resistance against land confiscation. Faced by this situation, the US intensified its oppressive military rule, claiming that Okinawans were not mature enough for self government.

Under this iron-fist rule land confiscation continued. As the U.S. launched the Vietnam War, Okinawa was turned into the launching base of B52 bombers to attack North Vietnam. Maki Supply Base became the biggest logistic base in this war, from which war materials, military vehicles and tanks were daily shipped to Vietnam and into which tanks broken in Vietnam were carried for repairs. The Vietnam War became part and parcel of Okinawa people’s daily life.

Throughout this period, Okinawa severed as the largest anti-Communist Cold War fortress in Asia equipped with powerful antennas and ultrasonic spy planes. The Nixon Doctrine was declared, but the bases in Okinawa continued to be the U.S.’s strategic outpost in Asia.

The return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 was arranged in exchange for the Japanese government’s guarantee that the strategic functions of Okinawa for the U.S. would be preserved. Even so, Okinawa faced a new situation. The rule of Okinawa shifted from the early military rule to the direct U.S. rule and then to the Japanese rule. The US presence in Okinawa now became one taken care of by its host country, Japan, based on the Japan-US Security Treaty.

The Japanese government guarantees that the U.S. would continue to securely use the bases in Okinawa and shared the common understanding with the U.S. that people’s demands should be met as long as this guarantee was honored. This agreement provided that nuclear weapons be removed from Okinawa at the expense of the Japanese government.

Also, the army units in Okinawa were replaced by marines. The principal U.S. forces in Okinawa shifted to the Air Force based in Kadena airfield, marines and army special forces. The Japanese Diet passed a resolution calling for the reduction and consolidation of the US bases in Okinawa.

The presence of the marines has come as a further burden on Okinawa people. They alternated on shore and on sea duty on the Seventh Fleet every six month. The marines are storm troopers, and they proved a new threat to local people. Militarily, their operation covers a vast area from the Cape of Good Hope in Africa through Australia to the Pacific Ocean. With the joint exercises with Japan’s Self Defense Forces, the marines are equipped to respond to any occurrence from the Korean peninsula to the Middle East. The aircraft in Okinawa was shifted from F4 Phantom to F15 Eagle and E3A planes with emphasis from air-to-ground attacks to control of the air. Also, intensified were reconnaissance flights by SR71 along the continental coasts. The standard uniform was change from the jungle-camouflaged combat fatigue to a brown uniform designed for desert battles. The marines are an armed entity proud to go anywhere on the planet. The US base in Okinawa looms as a patron god to protect the US interests in Asia. At the same time, the US presence in Okinawa has much to do with Japan’s militarization.

The heavier its presence, the more serious the danger the U.S. military poses to the people in Okinawa. Okinawa people experienced increasing cases of U.S. military-caused accidents and crimes. The rape of a girl in 1995 was a typical example. The incident happened just when the Japanese government was examining plans to help overhaul 50-year old U.S. bases in Okinawa into modernized, function-rational bases at the Japanese government cost. Under the impact of the rape incident and the rising anger of the Okinawa people, the Japanese and U.S. governments created a structure called SACO (Special Action Committee) for readjustment and consolidation of the bases in Okinawa. The local government of Okinawa made it clear that no such plan would be accepted by the Okinawa people unless it included reduction of the bases. With this pressure, SACO had to discuss adjustment, consolidation, and reduction. SACO submitted its final report in December, 1996, but the report did not refer to reduction but proposes moving the locations of bases within the island. The needed reduction did not occur. The major plan that came from SACO was the construction a huge offshore marine base with 2,500 meter-runways off the coast of Henoko, part of Nago city, as the alternative to Futenma base that was to be abolished. The intention is to help marines to unify the functions of an airport, marine’s port of sally, and training facilities by the establishment of this new base. Though the U.S. communication units are withdrawing, the Special Forces, the Marines and the Air Force are being strengthened.


3. People’s Struggle and Resistance

Struggle on the Prefectural Road No 104

From 1973, the U.S. military closed prefectural road No. 104 that passes through Camp Hansen for firing exercises using 105mm and 155 mm howitzers. Live shells were shot over the road. The residents denied the use of the road indispensable to their daily life organized protest action against this exercise, joined by peace organizations and labor unions. Finally they entered the impact area and forced the U.S. to suspend the exercises. The strategy worked and the protesters continued occupying the impact area, sometimes braving the danger from the shells dropping around them. In September, 1976, the movement was forced to change the strategy when some of the members were arrested under the special criminal law earlier enacted for the implementation of the security treaty. The struggle, however, continued until the locations of the shelling exercises were transferred to five different places in mainland Japan.


2.4 General Strike

On November 19, 1968, at the height of the Vietnam War, a B52 bomber loaded with bombs on its way to North Vietnam crashed right after taking off the Kadena Base. The incident gave a rise to a large campaign to demand the withdrawal of B52 bombers from Okinawa. The US government, however, insisted that this was not a major accident. The Japanese government stated that it had no intention to demand of the U.S. the removal of B52 bombers. In Okinawa, many protest actions mainly organized by labor unions continued. For the first time, the Union of Military Base Workers (Zengunro) came up with a resolution demanding the withdrawal of the bases. It became clear that neither the US government nor the Japanese government had a correct understanding of the people of Okinawa. As people’s awareness about the critical reality of Okinawa grew stronger, many local governments of the islands came up with resolutions against the bases. In 1968, the Okinawa people obtained the right to elect their administrative representative and Mr. Yara Chobyo, president of militant teachers union, was elected the first governor. Up to then, the chief executive officer was appointed by the U.S. As local people’s organizations, women’s movement and other groups continued demanding the withdrawal of B52, many unions decided to organize a strike. The “Prefectural People’s Joint Struggle Coalition for Life” was formed by over 140 organizations and the struggle headed toward a general strike. The US issued High Commissioner’s Order to ban the strike, but that was counterproductive. As the struggle spread all over the islands, the Japanese government had to take heed of it. The General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo), the largest labor federation in mainland Japan, also began to take action. But this formation got split over the issue of general strike. Those against general strike, claiming that an informal commitment had been made to give the date of B52 withdrawal, maintained that the governor’s position should be protected. Others insisted on the need of the strike. The protest action scheduled for February 4 was carried out without this division overcome.

　

Struggle of Military Base Workers (Zengunro)

　The struggle of those who work at the US bases was another threat to the US Forces. The Union was much affected by mass dismissals of its members, but they rose in struggle for two demands -- the removal of the bases and cancellation of mass dismissal, apparently demands contradicting each other. The Zengunro did not have the right to wage a strike and so resorted to the legal tactic of simultaneous paid leave taking. But that developed into a 48 hour strike, and then to 120 hour strike. The gate to the base’s nuclear weapons area was　closed by the striking picketers, who were threatened by armed GIs. The situation was extremely tense. The US Forces prohibited the soldiers from going out of the bases. Merchants doing business for GIs, upset by the loss of customers, stoned the strikers. The incident showed the complexity of the Okinawa situation.


Koza Riot

　On December 20, 1970, a vehicle driven by an American soldier hit an Okinawan. The Military Police who rushed to the site paid no attention to the victim and tried to carry away the car to the base. Around 1,000 people surrounded them and protested. The frightened MP started fired warning shots. As the angry people closed in, the MPs ran away firing shots. The soldier responsible for the incident was beaten up. More and more people gathered and started burning the vehicles nearby such as army trucks, MP jeeps and cars with yellow plates that indicated the US ownership. Towards the midnight, the crowd kept growing. One group burned police boxes while the other went to Kadena Base. They broke the gate and set fire on the filing cabinets and the American school. Armed soldiers fired tear gas. Helicopters also sprayed tear gas over the masses. This group was pushed outside by the armed soldiers while the other headed towards the U.S. headquarters. By the dawn, they all dispersed. Some 80 cars were destroyed. 19 were arrested and many wounded. The police applied the crime of riot but could not prosecute any of them. They were charged with other crimes and punished. There was no damage recorded to persons or properties of Okinawa.

In those days, 63% of Koza (present Okinawa city) was occupied by the bases. Koza’s economy was 80% dependent on the bases. On one hand, Koza flourished “thanks to” the war in Vietnam. On the other hand, Koza suffered much by the crimes committed by the GIs. Koza Riot in a way was a natural outcome of this situation. The US government still remembers the fear caused by Koza riot. Though it was a spontaneous riot, there was a certain order and discipline observed by all who joined it.

There was another incident that indirectly led people to riot. On September 18, 1970, a drunken GI driver killed a woman in Itoman-city in the south of the main island. The military court found him innocent on December 11 by reasons of lack of evidence. After 1970, violent crimes committed by American soldiers rose to 1,000 every year. They included homicides, rapes and burglaries. The number of U.S. soldier-caused traffic accidents was over 3000 a year. All the crimes were handled by the MPs who concealed evidence. The accused were tried by closed military courts and declared either innocent or given minor punishments.


Struggle to Demand the Withdrawal of Poisonous Gas

In July, 1969, the leak of VX nerve gas from a container in Kadena Base was discovered. The discovery led people to organize action. The US Forces organized a plan called “Operation Red Hat” to transfer the gas to Johnston Island in the Pacific. On December 20, the day before the Koza Riot, there was a big gathering of the Okinawa people to demand withdrawal of poisonous gas. All these incidents served as the background against which the Koza riot exploded.


Association of Anti-War Landowners

　After 1972 when Okinawa was turned over to Japan, more and more people of Okinawa began articulating their firm conviction that the US should not continue using their land. This was the time to take back the land “plundered at gun points and with bulldozers.” As Okinawa became part of Japan, the land unilaterally confiscated during the U.S. rule now became subject to regulations linked to the Security Treaty. This meant that from now on it was the Japanese government that was to conclude contracts with the owners of the land tracts used as bases and then lease them to the U.S. When it came to the making of contracts, over 30,000 landowners refused to sign contacts. This action led to the formation of the Anti-War Landowners’ Association for the Protection of Rights and Properties. The Japanese government, however, ignoring the will of the Okinawa people, passed a fixed-term law (five years) called “the law of temporary use of public land” that allowed the US Forces and Japan’s Self Defense Forces to use land for their bases without the consent of the landowners. People criticized the Japanese government that accepted the confiscation by the US Forces by bulldozers and armed violence. The government tried to complete all contracts in the prescribed period of five years, but found itself in a bizarre situation because of the resistance put up by the anti-war landowners. They refused to sign the contracts, and so the U.S. occupation of their land areas lost legal grounds. May 15, 1977 was the last day of the term of the legislation, and the Diet was in a chaotic situation over what to do with this issue. The landowners picketed the US bases and those of the Self Defense Forces in Okinawa. The SDF having lost the legal base had to open their base gates to the proper owners. The landowners since their land was confiscated in 1945, were able to touch it after 32 years. They touched the land, enjoyed picnic lunch and felt as if the long lost children suddenly had come back to them. The US opened gates in some bases. The proper owners entered there and planted vegetables. They had been their farmlands before confiscation. US soldiers stood by watcging. The situation in Kadena Base, the largest in Far East, was different. The gates were firmly closed and refused the entry of the landowners. The illegal occupation lasted four days. The Japanese Diet, once again ignoring the will of the landowners, extended the term of the law. The landowners felt that they had done something important to neutralize Japan-US Security Treaty. Their struggle based on their conviction that no piece of land should be rented for war had a strong impact on both governments. The experience of the Four Days consolidated the anti-war struggle of Okinawa.

The anti-war landowners have since been under the tenacious pressure of the government to change their attitude. The struggle continues at the court but the judicial system of this country is also hard on people who demand justice. The number of anti-war landlords has visibly decreased since. To support the remaining anti-war landowners, the Association of One-Tsubo Landowners has been formed. Their struggle continues.

　

4. Wars in which Bases in Okinawa were Used as Mission Launching Bases

Korean War, Vietnam War, Gulf War, Invasion of Afghanistan, and Iraq War. (During the occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Iran, C-130 Transport planes were sent from Okinawa in the hostage rescue operation. The mission was a failure).


Violence against Women under Long-Term U.S Military Station in Okinawa

Suzuyo Takazato (Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence)



1. Impacts on Women and Children by the US Military Bases in the Community

The Status of Forces Agreement stipulated in the Article 6 of the US-Japan Security Treaty assures favorable conditions of US military personnel including freedom of movement outside the bases. The US military bases occupy about 20% of the main island of Okinawa where 27,000 soldiers are stationed together with their families and dependents of more than 20,000. Their military training, lives, education opportunities and recreations are safely provided on the bases guarded by the fences and gates. Contrary to their assured safety, lives of women and children of local community have been targeted of violence for the past 58 years.


A. The end of WWII (1945) to the eve of Korean War – Rampant and indiscriminate crimes against women

When the Battle of Okinawa, a fierce battle described as “ iron storm” was over, the US soldiers started to randomly attack women in Okinawa.

1.

Two to six soldiers abduct one woman at gun or knife point.
2.

After gang-raping a victim, she would often be given to other groups of soldiers to gang-rap.
3.

Soldiers did not hesitate to kill or severely injure those who tried to help victims.
4.

Assaults can happen any places including in the field, on streets, around wells, by the water, in front of families.
5.

Assaults often showed brutality. Women with infants on her back were raped and killed. Victims’ ages range from 9 months old to 60’s.
6.

Victims gave birth. In the four years after the end of the World War II, 450 children were identified to have been fathered by the GIs.
7.

Perpetrators were mostly not apprehended, left unpunished.

B. Vietnam War – Violence was turned to women working around the bases.

Women working around the bases were often the target of violence by the soldiers who returned from the battle fields of the Vietnam War. They brought back fear and anger from the battle fields. Rape cases were rampant. Three to four women were strangled to death yearly. In the survey conducted in 1969, about 7,400 women worked in the sex industry. These women earned dollars in the still economically poor society. They were forced to sell sex because of a large amount of loan imposed on them in the forced managed prostitution. Many of these women experienced to be nearly strangled to death more than once, experience that left many of them suffering from trauma.


C. Present: date rape―“consensual” violence

After the end of the Vietnam War, the US military changed its policy from drafting to volunteer. In reality, however, volunteer only induced “poverty draft” in which poor population such as African American and Hispanic increased. The economic power declined. The rape by three US soldiers in September, 1995 shows a close proximity between the bases and local communities. Soldiers meet women at night clubs or at the beach, invite them to the bases where they can go shopping at PX for better prices. They invite them to their luxurious apartments on the bases which was build by the “sympathy” budget that the Japanese government provides This is how the crime of “date rapes” are committed now, in the disguise of “consensus.”


2. Impacts of September 11 Incident

As the training and security of the bases intensified, crimes committed by the US soldiers increased after 9.11. Changes within the operation caused by the Wars on Afghanistan and Iraq clearly have affected their transfer and training. For example, in the rape and assault case in August 2003, the perpetrator could have gone back to the US had there been no war, but his station was extended by 6 months, during the time, he committed the crime.


3. The Most Serious Concerns Faced by the Cmmunity

1.

Sixty percent of the US military stationed in Okinawa consists the Marine Corps. Eighty percent of the Marines are young soldeirs, between 18 to 22 years old, who are stationed in Okinawa for only 6 months. Sixty percent of the crimes by the US military is committed by the Marines. They bring young women to the bases easily where more crimes are committed. Contrary to increased poverty among young soldiers, they enjoy luxurious facilities built by the sympathy budge of the Japanese government. Current conditions make it more difficult for victims to accuse perpetrators.
2.

In recent cases, perpetrators of assaults and attempted assaults tend to be increasingly confrontational at trials. In the assault case of June 2001, in which a soldier raped an Okinawan woman at a parking lot of a commercial area, the perpetrator, a special service unit soldier, who has been stationed in Okinawa for four years, never withdrew his insistence on “consensual sex.” The verdict of the Japanese court admitted the victim’s assertion that she was raped, yet, the difficulty faced by the victim in this case implies a possibility of unwillingness of victims to come forward fearing retaliation by the US military.


4. Local Initiatives

Okinawa Woman Act Against Military Violence have engaged in our own activities as well as solidarity actions with “the citizens coalition to remove US bases from Okinawa and to achieve world peace” to which over 30 groups belong.

Achievements

o

Women’s transnational networks have developed such as East Asia-US-Puerto Rico Women’s Network against Militarism. This is a movement of women from the United States, the country who sends the troops, and women from host nations of the US troops have worked together to create authentic security system from a perspective of the human rights of women and children, criticizing militarized security.
o

We have gained deeper and wider recognition of the relationship of violence against women in war time, in the present conflicts, under long-term military station, and around the military bases through working with women in VAWW-NET, International Women’s Tribunal on Military Sexual Slavery Japan held in December 2000, Public Hearing on Crimes Against Women in Recent Wars and Conflicts also held in December 2000.
o

Due to our actions, the video-link system and supporter system when a victims of sexual violence testifies was adopted at the court.
o

Younger generations of women have developed community activities.

Issue and Analysis

o

After 9.11, militarization has been accelerated by the military attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States. This situation goes against our hope for a world of non-violence and peaceful coexistence. The presence of US military in Okinawa could be even more solidified by the “carrots and stick” of the Japanese government policies: Stick being the Special Measures Law on the land use of the US military that justifies originally unlawful expropriation of the land; carrot being government subsidies to local communities. Militarization of daily lives has also been accelerated.
o

Existing movements should be further pursued. Also, community development under local initiative, address to create a sustainable coexisting society with respect to diversity should be pursued.

*

We shall seek for revising SOFA and the US-Japan Security Treaty from a gender perspective. Revising SOFA does not mean acceptance of the US bases on our land. It is to limit violation of the human rights of women and children by the military. If the SOFA should be truly equal between the US and Japan, the bases should not be able to exit. The unequal treatment due to the difference between jurisdictions of the US and Japan should be eliminated.

=== Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence ===