The Truth About Hamas

The Truth about Hamas

By Ahmad Rashad
Ahmad Rashad, author of Hamas: Palestinian Politics with an Islamic Hue, is a Research Associate at the United Association for Studies and Research.

Introduction

Despite its relative youth, the Islamic Resistance Movement, commonly known by its Arabic acronym, Hamas, has become a significant force in the realm of Palestinian politics. A number of factors have led to its growing grass-roots popularity: its call for the liberation of all Palestine; a reputation for efficiency, honesty, and lack of corruption; daring and successful attacks on Israeli military targets; a remarkable resilience to Israeli crackdowns; the presence of its leadership largely within the territories, as opposed to the PLO's expatriate direction; and its firm yet pragmatic approach to a nationalist camp seen increasingly as abandoning the armed struggle against the "Zionist entity."

The movement's ability not only to survive thus far, but to present itself as a significant contender for the mantle of Palestinian representative, comes from a combination of its populism and a prudent approach to inter-Arab affairs that affect support for its operations. The recent peace accord, reached in September, is not likely to deter Hamas' policy of confronting the occupation. The Islamists view the agreement as a superficial document aimed at legitimizing Israeli control of Palestinian land and resources. They have expressed concern over the possibility of bloody inter-factional violence. They have repeatedly issued leaflets forbidding members from engaging in such acts. Hamas' pragmatism has ensured its longevity; and it will remain an important element in the future of the occupied territories.

Initially, Hamas identified itself as a wing of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The strong affinity stems from the fact that several Brotherhood cadres were instrumental in Hamas' establishment.

The Brotherhood had been priming a political wing, albeit a vague one, for some time prior to the uprising. It decided during 1985/86 to implement a policy of resistance via civil disturbance. It issued leaflets to this effect under several names, such as Harakat al-Kifah al-Musallah (Armed Struggle Movement), al-Murabitoon ala Ard al-Isra' (The Steadfast on the Land of al-Isra'), and Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement, IRM). These communiqués were concerned primarily with corruption and immorality; but they became more politicized as tensions escalated in the territories. The irm distributed leaflets during 1987 warning Palestinians against the tactics employed by the Shin Bet, Israel's secret service, of using intimidation, drugs, blackmail, and sexual coercion to induce young Palestinians to collaborate against activists. "Hamas" began appearing on the IRM communiqués during January 1988.
Structure

Hamas is composed of administrative, charitable, political, and military elements, which have subdivisions. The administrative wing coordinates the movement's actions. Charity work is conducted in cooperation with other Islamic centers sympathetic to Hamas. The political activity that takes place within the territories is confined to Hamas sympathizers participating in local elections. The "military" wing is the most active within the occupied territories, particularly since Hamas' main goal is battling the Israeli occupation.

Given that all the founders were Brethren, Hamas' structure borrows heavily from the movement. For example, each region is comprised of "families" and branches, answerable to an administrative center. Hamas members are not singular in perspective. There are four general categories in which they fallintelligentsia, sheikhs (religious leaders), younger leadership candidates, and activists.

Hamas was designed to allow for the induction of members not affiliated with the Brotherhood. Several elements of the Brethren that were transferred to Hamas were eventually phased out and replaced by similar cells that remain highly secretive. Two such examples are al-Majd and al-Mujahidün established in 1983, the Brotherhood's intelligence and commando units, respectively. Israeli forces were able to crack down on these groups within the first two years of the intifada. They re-emerged later as part of the 'Izzedin Qassam Brigades, which function independently of Hamas' main operations.

The intelligence wing implements six directives: surveil collaborators and drug dealers; castigate those found guilty of treason, prostitution or selling narcotics (punishment ranges from verbal warning to execution); distribute the group's "information" leaflets; publicize Israeli recruitment policies for collaboration and warn the populace against complicity; write and disburse communiqués; and manage logistic support for the organization. The intelligence wing also monitors crime in the territories. Israeli occupation authorities ceased directing their resources toward combating crime at the intifada's outset. In fact, criminal activity is tolerated because it provides ample ground for the recruitment of informants.

The commando units have four primary objectives: establish usar (families) and underground cells; gather information on Israeli Defence Force (idf) activities for use in planned operations; conduct training sessions in hand-to-hand combat; and carry out military operations, including the abduction of enemy soldiers. These two groups operate exclusively within the occupied territories and Israel. Hamas founders created other wings that are in constant contact with the inside, but fulfill their functions outside. These are al-Maktab al-I'lami and al- Maktab al-Siyassi, the Information and Political Offices, respectively.

The Information Office, located in Jordan, is responsible for preparing and disseminating all press releases concerned with Hamas statements of policy. It also issues publications in Hamas' name. The Political Office is concerned with Hamas' foreign relations and represents the organization at conferences and meetings that deal with Palestinian affairs. These two appendages to the movement were borne out of the Gulf War, in order to maintain the movement's contact with foreign officials and journalists.
Goals

The Islamists first revealed a synopsis of their goals in a January 22, 1988 communiqué. Immediate objectives are: "release of the detainees; rejection of the settlements, the policy of expulsion, administrative detention, brutalization of civilians and detainees, the denial of travel, harassment, the spread of immorality, bribery, corruption, entrapment in the nets of the secret service, the denial of the right of return, astronomical taxes, and other reprehensible occupation policies." The group's charter would reinforce these aims, but would also keep the door open for political activity.

Hamas issued its long-term goals in April 1994. The movement declared that it is not opposed to the principle of peace. In addition, it outlined a pragmatic policy position by declaring its willingness to cease military operation in the West Bank and Gaza, as long as the following conditions are met: 1) complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories; 2) disarming the settlers and dismantling the settlements; 3) placing international forces on the "green line" established in the occupied territories during the '48 and '67 wars; 4) free and general elections to determine true representation of the Palestinian people; and 5) the Council, which will be composed of electoral victors, shall represent the Palestinians in any negotiations that determine their future and that of the occupied territories.
Support and Funds

Relief centers operated predominantly by Islamists are sometimes given the distinction of being "Hamas" institutions. While the reference is not completely incorrect, it is misleading. There are numerous Muslim activists who sympathize with Hamas, but have limited knowledge about its operations. These activists are involved in eleemosynary foundations, development projects, health clinics, and so on. Some of them do provide either moral or material support to Hamas' political wing. This earns the institutions in which they work a "Hamas" label. Some prominent commentators have pointed out the ambiguities involved. That there is a link between Hamas and these operations, however, is not in doubt. Put simply, Hamas works within the framework of Islamic institutions in the occupied territories, but not as a clearly defined organization as may be implied when discussing "Hamas" social projects.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that most of Hamas' funds and efforts are directed toward assisting the populace. Sarah Roy, a visiting scholar at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University, notes:

Hamas runs the best social service network in the Gaza Strip.... Structured and well organized, Hamas is trusted by the poor (Gaza's overwhelming majority) to deliver on its promises, and is perceived to be far less corrupt and subject to patronage than its secular nationalist counterparts, especially Fateh. Indeed, it is not only Palestinians who regard Hamas in this way, but a growing number of foreign assistance providers as well. Some senior officials at unrwa [United Nations Relief Works and Agency] in Gaza acknowledged that Hamas is the only faction they trust to distribute unrwa food donations to the people.

Pro-Hamas Islamists, in coordination with the Brethren, collect zakat (an obligatory 2.5% of a Muslim's earnings) via local committees. These funds are used in helping the poor, building mosques and schools, and other charitable work. In addition to donations, Hamas supporters create small projects aimed at generating limited income but allowing self- sufficiency. These include the production of honey, cheese-making ventures, and home-based clothes manufacturing. Finally, the Islamists allocate a considerable portion of their resources to assisting younger Palestinians.

The movement's funding is equally difficult to discern. Although a great deal has been written about an Iranian and/or Saudi connection, there has been little substantial evidence to corroborate such assertions. During the uprising's early days, journalists identified Hamas as "a Saudi-backed Islamic group." The PLO's Yasser Arafat has stated that Hamas receives between $20 to $30 million from Iran, a sum repeated frequently in the media. Claiming that Hamas funds stem primarily from Tehran began during 1989, when Israel first decided that the group was a serious security threat, and the PLO jumped on the bandwagon. In reality, Hamas has shown no leanings toward a specific government in seeking support. Its spokesmen aver that most of its financial resources depend upon philanthropic individuals and organizations. Among the groups that have extended assistance to Hamas are the international Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic organizations in the Indian continent, and Islamic factions in Turkey, Malaysia, and Afghanistan. According to Ibrahim Ghosheh, Hamas' official spokesman, "the fact of the matter is that Hamas receives modest support from many Muslims in the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan, Yemen, Turkey, and many others."

Elections

Despite the presence of far richer PLO institutions, Hamas has enjoyed tremendous support in the territories. The results of local elections provide an indication of popular support for Hamas. During June 1992, Palestinians in the West Bank city of Hebron held the first civil elections in the territories for 15 years; and Islamists sympathetic to Hamas won. Islamists defeated PLO candidates in union elections at Al Makassed Hospital in East Jerusalem during the same period. When elections took place in Ramallah, a city with a large Palestinian Christian community, Hamas candidates beat the P.L.O. in an election for the board of the Chamber of Commerce.

Several months later Mahmoud al-Zahhar, a pediatrician and political activist sympathetic to the Islamists, conducted a study of election results for the Bar Association, the Engineers' Syndicate, the Medical Association, the Accountants Association, the Gaza Chamber of Commerce, and the unrwa Workers' Union. According to al-Zahhar, 34,221 Palestinians voted in these elections; and Islamist candidates won 43% of the overall votes. Overall, however, Hamas has won the majority of votes. In addition to supporting political candidates as part of its comprehensive outlook to oppose the occupation, Hamas maintains combative underground cells.

Hamas and the PLO

Hamas' relationship to the PLO is complex and precarious at best. The Islamists have neither, to date, wanted nor been able to alienate the nationalist camp. Their fates are intertwined, particularly since, prior to the intifada, a number of disillusioned Brethren had joined the PLO; and many current Islamists are former nationalists.

When the intifada began, fiery imams and young members of Hamas set out to establish themselves as revolutionaries on par with the nationalists. They did not view themselves as an alternative, although, privately, the leadership did not rule that out. Even when Islamists were deported to southern Lebanon, and the nationalists gave only token objection, Islamic leaders did not want to see the PLO collapse. When The Jerusalem Report asked the expellees' spokesman, Rantissi, if the PLO financial crisis would strengthen Hamas, he responded: "I would like to express a neutral voice, the voice of a Palestinian who does not necessarily work for Hamas. If the PLO had to collapse, I'd be very sad. It would have a negative effect on our cause and our rights. Also, speaking from a narrow, factional perspective, I don't believe it is in Hamas' interest to see the downfall of the PLO." The Islamists were convinced that national unity should not be undermined irrespective of ideological differences. Hamas issued a leaflet on August 28, 1993, just days prior to the Gaza-Jericho announcement, stating emphatically that "national reconciliation is the solution."

The September 1993 Gaza-Jericho agreement came as a shock and surprise to many activists. The elite PLO hierarchy had decided to risk making an alliance with Israel in order, among other things, to eliminate the Islamic challenge to its authority. Haim Ramon, the Israeli health minister, declared: "We are fully aware to the raise [sic] of power of the extremists, of the fundamentalism in the Gaza Strip; and we believe that together, the moderate parts of the Palestinians and the Government of Israel, together, will fight and can win the fight against the extremists."

According to Danny Rubinstein, a commentator for Ha'aretz, "Arafat will be able to bribe his society" away from Hamas with money secured from international donors. The deal marked the first time Hamas issued unrelenting attacks against Arafat as a traitor. It sarcastically referred to the accord as a flagitious deal, al-ittifaqiyyah al-'Arafatiyyah (Arafat's agreement), between the PLO chairman and the leadership of the "Zionist enemy."

In addition, the Islamists foresee inter-Palestinian clashes resulting from the deal. Muhammed Nazzal, a senior Hamas spokesman in Jordan, asserts: "We are ready for the worst possibilities, including cooperation between the Palestinian police, [operating] under the orders of Yasser Arafat, and the Israeli army and the Shin Bet to confront the Hamas combatants." Nevertheless, Hamas continues to adopt a cordial tone toward the PLO and Fateh.
Hamas and the West

Hamas' first contact with the West was toward the end of 1991, when it held meetings with several European diplomats. After Israel's expulsion of Islamist sympathizers, Hamas met with several Western officials, including diplomats from the United States, Britain, Italy, and Germany. The movement's leaders have long considered cordial, if not friendly, relations with the West an important part of their political agenda. Hamas leaders were perturbed, though not altogether surprised, when the State Department officially included the group in its annual report on global terrorism. Hamas stated that Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Edward Djerejian's explanation for the move was "strange."

The State Department's move coincided with Israeli allegations that Hamas has established a nerve center on U.S. territory. The movement's leadership accused the American government of succumbing to pressure from pro-Israeli pacs.

Pressure from pro-Israeli lobbyists arguably swayed a number of Congressmen into initiating a witch-hunt for alleged Hamas activists. This drive grew in intensity when Israel arrested several Palestinian Americans and charged them with being part of Hamas' U.S. network. The first initiative came from Representatives Charles E. Grassley and Frank R. Lautenberg, who began their campaign by applauding the State Department's decision. They felt, however, that not enough had been done, writing: "we believe the [State Department's annual] report should include a thorough review of the organization's activities and operationsincluding fund- raisingin the United States."

Other Members of Congress who jumped on the bandwagon were Peter Deutsch, R. James Saxton, Alcee L. Hastings, and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who "introduced h.r. 1279, a bill to list members of Hamas as individuals engaged in terrorist activity and to bar them from entering the United States." The four repeated Israeli claims that "[o]ver the past several years, Hamas has been conducting operations from several locations in the United States. Israeli intelligence has reportedly raised concerns about the scope of Hamas' operations in the u.s., and the fbi has confirmed that Hamas has engaged in fundraising activities in U.S. cities."

Yet by far the sharpest attack came from New York's Senator Alfonse D'Amato who repeated Israeli rhetoric almost verbatim: "This radical Islamic fundamentalist group is based in the Gaza Strip but also operates in Judea and Samaria." He continued: "Within our midst, this expansive network is aiding Hamas in its terror and murder in Israel. Acting in the guise of simple fundraising, groups in northern Virginia, Dallas, Detroit, Chicago, Tucson, and in my State of New York, are channeling large amounts of money back to Hamas in the Gaza Strip...."

Representatives Jim Saxton and Peter Deutsch represent another example of blatant reliance on Israeli information. They photocopied and distributed a report by the Israel Defence Force's Information Branch to Congress. The two Representatives sent an attached note making the assertion that "Hamas...[is] no longer confined to the Middle East, but organized enough to strike downtown America." Despite Hamas' repeated insistence that it had no interest in striking U.S. interests, the aforementioned politicians continued their efforts.

In spite of the ominous warnings issued by some politicians, American security services have found little or no evidence of clandestine activity. Despite the inclusion of Hamas in the State Department's annual report on global terrorism, neither the State Department nor the FBI have lent credence to claims by Israel, the media, or politicians that Hamas operates a base on U.S. soil.
Conclusion

In light of pressure by the Israelis, Arafat, and some Members of Congress, Hamas is currently in a precarious position. The Gaza-Jericho agreement was reached, to a large degree, because of the mutual threat felt by Israeli and PLO leaders. The Clinton Administration's decision to adopt Israel's analysis of Hamas, end its dialogue with the group, prop up the PLO, and push for a speedy accord (although Norway brokered the Gaza- Jericho plan, the United States had been putting immense pressure on the PLO to reach a settlement) is a gross miscalculation. Assuming that the Islamists will be dealt with either by initiating the infusion of monetary assistance into parts of the West Bank and Gaza, or by allowing a Palestinian police force try to reign them in, misreads the situation in the territories.

Moreover, once Arafat loyalists have successfully been given authority over the "strong police force," they will more likely than not play partisan politics rather than engage in real crime-fighting. For its part, Hamas has been careful to avoid an inter-Palestinian conflict. It has forbidden the use of violence as a solution to factional differences. When inter-Fateh rivalries claimed the lives of several activists, Hamas issued a communiqué denouncing the murders specifically and condemning the use of assassinations as a tool to achieve political goals generally. In addition, it will participate in elections if given the opportunity.

The Qassam brigades also vow to escalate their guerrilla warfare against the Israeli occupation. Arafat feels he must justify his commitment to Israel and consolidate his own power-base by suppressing such activity. Arafat loyalists, therefore, will attempt to discredit the Islamists as fanatics and question their loyalty to Palestinian unity while simultaneously isolating leaders and hunting activists. That there will be incidents of inter-Palestinian conflict is certain. Their ferocity and frequency, however, depend largely on how far Arafat plans to pursue the Islamists.

Hamas will not initiate confrontation with Arafat loyalists because it is aware that it would face a potentially well-armed partisan police force backed by Israel. However, a number of these individuals, having fought the Israeli occupation for most of their lives, will find it difficult to participate in suppressing Islamist activity; and Hamas will not leave such reservations without comment. Hamas' spokesman in Jordan, Ibrahim Ghosheh, has referred to candidates for these units as ardent nationalists who sacrificed much for the Palestinian cause. Such statements are part of Hamas' policy of not alienating the PLO's mid-level leadership or its mainstream supporters.

Although Hamas vows to continue its struggle, it will carefully calculate each move. There are a number of possible paths to follow, all of which are currently being debated by Hamas cadres. In addition, discussions are under way to review the possibility of establishing an alternative to the PLO.

Hamas' future depends to a large degree upon two factors. First, the accord's success rate. Many Palestinians were initially ecstatic over the agreement because their expectations were high. Arafat has reinforced this perception. He insists that the agreement is the beginning of a state; and he has declared that Palestinian refugees will be allowed to return. Rabin, however, notes that on the final status "[t]here is nothing about a Palestinian state"; and Palestinian estimates that hundreds of thousands of refugees will be allowed back is "nonsense." In addition, settlement activity has not decreased. In fact, the Christian Science Monitor reports that settlers will receive a boost from "a Housing Ministry plan, just unveiled, to spend a massive $660 million on new roads in the occupied territories, to link settlements and to provide settlers with routes that skirt major Palestinian population areas." Since the agreement, Palestinian euphoria over the deal has significantly dropped, especially after such incidents as the massacre at al-Ibrahimi mosque.

Second, the Islamists ability to withstand the inevitable, albeit tacit, coalition between a police force loyal to Arafat and the Shin Bet is crucial to their survival. It is unlikely that the Israelis will continue to deal with Arafat if he does not curtail both Islamist and nationalist actions against the occupying authority. Relations between Israelis and Arafat are tense now, but since both parties have vested interests in achieving some form of a settlement, they will probably stick the Gaza-Jericho accord together with bubble gum if glue isn't available.

To quell Israeli security concerns, the PLO chairman will sanction full cooperation between his police force and the Israeli secret service. This will certainly not be publicized; but such joint action cannot be maintained for long before a pattern of collaboration is recognized by Palestinians in the territories. If the Islamists can survive long enough for this perception to dominate the public mood, they will likely increase their support base; and they will then be able to rely on more Palestinians for assistance in either challenging the new authority or evading it. As the situation is, Hamas' bold attacks on settlers and soldiers has many Palestinians rethinking their support for the accord and the PLO.

Cracks are already beginning to take shape in the plan (the assassination of several pro-Arafat individuals at the hands of dissenting nationalist groups, PLO-Israeli disagreement over what the terms of the accord constitute, and so on). Moreover, although some wealthy nations have pledged financial support, their generosity will not last long. European states and America, the most vocal proponents of the accord, merely want to sweep what they perceive to be an incessant Arab-Israeli problem under the rug, at least for the next decade, in order to solve more pressing problems such as the restructuring of Eastern Europe, keeping Central Asian states at bay, and ensuring a steady flow of oil from the Middle East. The Palestinian authority will likely be managed as poorly as was the PLO. Moreover, it will not promote democracy. Arafat has shown no signs whatsoever, other than the honeyed rhetoric he and the likes of Nabil Shaath are full off, that true representation in Palestinian society is a primary goal held by PLO cadres. Hamas will run for almost every election in order not fall into the PLO's beuracratic quagmire. The PLO, for the most part, will depend on external powers to provide it with the financial crutches necessary for its survival; and when this support is removed, the bureaucracy will crumble. Once this occurs, Palestinians will turn to the Islamists not necessarily out of ideological affinity, but because they will be the best equipped to satisfy the people's needs.

Yet perhaps the most destructive outcome will be if Arafat feels that he can adopt measures similar to those in Egypt or Syria in dealing with the Islamists. Such assumptions significantly underestimate Hamas' support base as well as its resolve. If the movement's past resilience to Israeli crackdowns is any indication, Hamas may be hurt by Arafat-Israeli measures in the short-term, but it is likely to remain a significant player in Palestinian politics for some time to come.