Excerpted from:
In a U.S. Attack Scenario, Iran Holds Many Cards
Speculating on how Iran might respond to a U.S. attack against Tehran's nuclear facilities, a member of the Global Islamic Movement told a Feb. 19 seminar on suicide-bombing tactics at Tehran's Khajeh Nasir Toosi University that hundreds of suicide bombers could be unleashed against U.S. and British troops in Iraq. Mohammed Ali Samadi, spokesman for the movement's Committee for the Glorification of Martyrs, might have been simply responding to U.S. and Israeli pressure on Iran over its developing nuclear program, though he did point out one of the many unconventional ways the Iranians could retaliate for an attack. Iran, however, has other methods at its disposal.
Historically, the ayatollahs at the helm in Tehran have demonstrated that they have the means and the will to strike at their enemies. In the event of a U.S. attack against Iran, then, Tehran could unleash Hezbollah, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) operatives against U.S. interests in the region, and possibly beyond.
1. Iran's intelligence apparatus remains one of the most sophisticated in the Middle East, due largely to the legacy of training provided by the CIA to SAVAK, the Shah's secret police.
2. Because the tactic has worked for Iran in the past, the Iranians also could conduct a global assassination and kidnapping campaign, with targets including Western diplomats and nongovernmental organization workers, among others.
3. Western hotels and areas where Western expatriates congregate would be vulnerable. Furthermore, these targets could be in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America or elsewhere. Hezbollah pioneered the use of the suicide truck bomb in Lebanon in the early 1980s, its most notable success being the October 1983 attack against the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. These skills could be brought to bear on U.S. interests again as retaliation for an attack against Iran.
4. Within the Middle East, the Iranians could disrupt U.S. efforts in Iraq by inciting the Shia in southern Iraq to attack coalition forces. Although Iran wants a Shiite-dominated, and thus Iran-friendly, neighbor -- and inciting the Shiite population in southern Iraq would complicate that goal -- a U.S. attack against Iran could change the Iranian position.
5. Iran also has canned operations -- sleeper cells that are awaiting activation -- in Latin America and Southeast Asia.
6. Within the United States, a Hezbollah network was revealed in the summer of 2004 -- as well as those supporting any unknown Hezbollah network -- could be called into action.
7. As a state actor, Iran would have to make certain to distance itself from any attack against U.S. or Western interests -- especially large-scale attacks inside the United States or Western Europe. As a nation state, Iran would have to conduct such a retaliatory campaign with the knowledge that it would be held accountable for its actions if they were proven to be linked back to Tehran. Therefore, retaliatory attacks most likely would be carried out by groups that do not appear to have direct connections to Tehran. Unlike a non-state actor such as al Qaeda or other jihadist group, the Iranian government has infrastructure, resources and territory to lose if it were to trigger a massive U.S. retaliation.
If attacked, Tehran's counterattack likely would be designed to give the United States so many fires to put out around the world that it could not concentrate on Iran."
End Excerpt
The U.S. is leveraged in multiple ways:
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dependent upon continuous flow of cheaper and cheaper goods to create spending leverage with fewer and fewer dollars of discretionary income available
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dependent upon rising housing prices so refinancing can continue* to reduce revolving debt
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dependent upon low interest rates to keep housing prices stable, or rising
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dependent upon "consumer economy" which spends such a large portion of it's income that it can drive monetary policy
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dependent upon the good will of energy suppliers, as we now import 60% of our energy needs
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dependent on our optimism, which drives the psychological constructs under girding our stock market, housing bubble, spending and service economy
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dependent upon a service economy where many layers depend on free spending Americans to support non-nessential services
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Geography of Iran
Location:
Middle East, bordering the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf, and the Caspian Sea, between Iraq and Pakistan
Coordinates:
32 00 N, 53 00 E
Area:
total: 1.648 million sq km
land: 1.636 million sq km
water: 12,000 sq km
Area comparative:
slightly larger than Alaska
Land boundaries:
total: 5,440 km
border countries: Afghanistan 936 km, Armenia 35 km, Azerbaijan-proper 432 km, Azerbaijan-Naxcivan exclave 179 km, Iraq 1,458 km, Pakistan 909 km, Turkey 499 km, Turkmenistan 992 km
Coastline:
2,440 km; note - Iran also borders the Caspian Sea (740 km)
Maritime claims:
contiguous zone: 24 NM
territorial sea: 12 NM
continental shelf: natural prolongation
exclusive economic zone: bilateral agreements or median lines in the Persian Gulf
Climate:
mostly arid or semiarid, subtropical along Caspian coast
Terrain:
rugged, mountainous rim; high, central basin with deserts, mountains; small, discontinuous plains along both coasts
Elevation extremes:
lowest point: Caspian Sea -28 m
highest point: Kuh-e Damavand 5,671 m
Natural resources:
petroleum, natural gas, coal, chromium, copper, iron ore, lead, manganese, zinc, sulfur
Natural hazards:
periodic droughts, floods; dust storms, sandstorms; earthquakes along western border and in the northeast
Environment current issues:
air pollution, especially in urban areas, from vehicle emissions, refinery operations, and industrial effluents; deforestation; overgrazing; desertification; oil pollution in the Persian Gulf; wetland losses from drought; soil degradation (salination); inadequate supplies of potable water; water pollution from raw sewage and industrial waste; urbanization
Geography - note:
strategic location on the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, which are vital maritime pathways for crude oil transport
Population of Iran
Population:
65,875,224 (July 2008 est.)
Age structure:
0-14 years: 26.1% (male 9,204,785/female 8,731,429)
15-64 years: 69% (male 24,133,919/female 23,245,255)
65 years and over: 4.9% (male 1,653,827/female 1,719,218)
Median age:
24.8 years
Growth rate:
1.1%
Infant mortality:
40.3 deaths/1,000 live births
Life expectancy at birth:
total population: 70.26 years
male: 68.86 years
female: 71.74 years
Fertility rate:
1.8 children born/woman
Nationality:
noun: Iranian(s)
adjective: Iranian
Ethnic groups:
Persian 51%, Azeri 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1%
Religions:
Shi'a Muslim 89%, Sunni Muslim 9%, Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i 2%
Languages:
Persian and Persian dialects 58%, Turkic and Turkic dialects 26%, Kurdish 9%, Luri 2%, Balochi 1%, Arabic 1%, Turkish 1%, other 2%
Literacy:
definition: age 15 and over can read and write
total population: 79.4%
male: 85.6%
female: 73%
Government
Country name:
conventional long form: Islamic Republic of Iran
former: Persia
local long form: Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran
Government type:
theocratic republic
Capital:
Tehran
Administrative divisions:
28 provinces (ostanha, singular - ostan); Ardabil, Azarbayjan-e Gharbi, Azarbayjan-e Sharqi, Bushehr, Chahar Mahall va Bakhtiari, Esfahan, Fars, Gilan, Golestan, Hamadan, Hormozgan, Ilam, Kerman, Kermanshah, Khorasan, Khuzestan, Kohgiluyeh va Buyer Ahmad, Kordestan, Lorestan, Markazi, Mazandaran, Qazvin, Qom, Semnan, Sistan va Baluchestan, Tehran, Yazd, Zanjan
Independence:
1 April 1979 (Islamic Republic of Iran proclaimed)
National holiday:
Republic Day, 1 April (1979)
note: additional holidays celebrated widely in Iran include Revolution Day, 11 February (1979); Noruz (New Year's Day), 21 March; Constitutional Monarchy Day, 5 August (1925)
Constitution:
2-3 December 1979; revised 1989 to expand powers of the presidency and eliminate the prime ministership
Legal system:
the Constitution codifies Islamic principles of government
Suffrage:
15 years of age; universal
Executive branch:
chief of state: Supreme Leader Ali Hoseini-KHAMENEI (since 4 June 1989)
head of government: President Mahmud AHMADI-NEJAD (since 3 August 2005); First Vice President Parviz DAVUDI (since 11 September 2005)
cabinet: Council of Ministers selected by the president with legislative approval; the Supreme Leader has some control over appointments to the more sensitive ministries
note: also considered part of the Executive branch of government are three oversight bodies: 1) Assembly of Experts (Majles-Khebregan), a popularly elected body charged with determining the succession of the Supreme Leader, reviewing his performance, and deposing him if deemed necessary; 2) Expediency Council or the Council for the Discernment of Expediency (Majma-e-Tashkise-Maslahat-e-Nezam) exerts supervisory authority over the executive, judicial, and legislative branches and resolves legislative issues on which the Majles and the Council of Guardians disagree and since 1989 has been used to advise national religious leaders on matters of national policy; in 2005 the Council's powers were expanded to act as a supervisory body for the government; 3) Council of Guardians of the Constitution or Council of Guardians or Guardians Council (Shora-ye Negaban-e Qanun-e Assassi) determines whether proposed legislation is both constitutional and faithful to Islamic law, vets candidates for suitability, and supervises national elections
elections: Supreme Leader is appointed for life by the Assembly of Experts; president is elected by popular vote for a four-year term (eligible for a second term and third nonconsecutive term); last held 17 June 2005 with a two-candidate runoff on 24 June 2005 (next presidential election slated for 12 June 2009).
Legislative branch:
unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly or Majles-e-Shura-ye-Eslami (290 seats - formerly 270 seats; members elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms)
Judicial branch:
Supreme Court - above a special clerical court, a revolutionary court, and a special administrative court
Economy
Iran's economy is marked by an inefficient state sector, reliance on the oil sector (which provides 85% of government revenues), and statist policies that create major distortions throughout. Most economic activity is controlled by the state. Private sector activity is typically small-scale workshops, farming, and services. President Mahmud AHMADI-NEJAD failed to make any notable progress in fulfilling the goals of the nation's latest five-year plan. A combination of price controls and subsidies, particularly on food and energy, continue to weigh down the economy, and administrative controls, widespread corruption, and other rigidities undermine the potential for private-sector-led growth. As a result of these inefficiencies, significant informal market activity flourishes and shortages are common. High oil prices in recent years have enabled Iran to amass nearly $70 billion in foreign exchange reserves. Yet this increased revenue has not eased economic hardships, which include double-digit unemployment and inflation - inflation climbed to 26% as of June 2008. The economy has seen only moderate growth. Iran's educated population, economic inefficiency and insufficient investment - both foreign and domestic - have prompted an increasing number of Iranians to seek employment overseas, resulting in significant "brain drain."
GDP:
$762.9 billion (2007 est.)
GDP growth rate:
6.1%
GDP per capita:
$8,300
GDP composition by sector:
agriculture: 11.6%
industry: 42.4%
services: 46%
Inflation rate:
13.5%
Labor force:
23.68 million
note: shortage of skilled labor
Labor force - by occupation:
agriculture 30%, industry 25%, services 45%
Unemployment:
11.2%
Budget:
revenues: $48.82 billion
expenditures: $60.4 billion
Electricity production by source:
fossil fuel: 97.1%
hydro: 2.9%
other: 0%
Industries:
petroleum, petrochemicals, textiles, cement and other construction materials, food processing (particularly sugar refining and vegetable oil production), metal fabricating, armaments
Agriculture:
wheat, rice, other grains, sugar beets, fruits, nuts, cotton; dairy products, wool; caviar
Exports:
petroleum 80%, chemical and petrochemical products, fruits and nuts, carpets
Export partners:
Japan 17.3%, China 11.4%, Italy 6.2%, South Africa 5.5%, South Korea 5.2%, France 4.5%, Turkey 4.5%, Taiwan 4.3%, Netherlands 4.3%
Imports:
industrial raw materials and intermediate goods, capital goods, foodstuffs and other consumer goods, technical services, military supplies
Import partners:
Germany 14.2%, China 8.3%, Italy 7.5%, UAE 6.7%, South Korea 6.4%, France 6.2%, Russia 5.3%
Currency:
Iranian rial (IRR)
SOURCES: The CIA World Factbook, U.S. Department of State, Area Handbook of the US Library of Congress
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Jan 15, 2009 11:16 | Updated Jan 15, 2009 11:20
Iran resurgent, Persia redux ( Excerpt from Jerusalem Post)
By STEPHEN SHAINWALD
A visitor to the Islamic Republic of Iran is constantly reminded that this Middle Eastern country is unique in the region, part-Persian, part-Islamic and part-Western - and not Arab.
In 1935 the Persian ambassador to Berlin wrote to Hitler, "We are Aryans," and the country's name was changed from Persia to Iran, "land of the Aryans" in Farsi.
The illustrious history of ancient Persia still resonates strongly. If anything, there has been a revival of interest in its scope and grandeur, and the Islamic Revolution of 1979 with its oppressive, Arabizing policies is sometimes referred to scornfully as "the second Arab invasion." Modern Iranians are proud that it took the seventh-century Arab invaders 200 years to subdue Persia and Zoroastrianism; that Persians later asserted their individuality by adopting Shi'ite rather than Sunni Islam; and that the Farsi language stubbornly survived even though Arabic script was imposed upon it.
Many cultural norms remain distinctly Persian. "Do Iranians have four wives?" "No, that's the Arab mentality!" The rich tradition of Persian poetry, full of love and wine, roses and nightingales, permeates language and culture. Iranians like to stroll in the elegant, traditional gardens of the mausoleums of their famous poets - Hafez, Sa'di, Rumi and others - whose works are a part of the school curriculum that the Islamist regime was unable to stamp out. Concepts of freedom, truth and human rights have deep roots here.
The world heritage, but pre-Islamic, ruins of Persepolis were barely saved from bulldozing ordered by zealous clerics. "But now," writes one blogger, "even religious conservatives are reconciling themselves with the past, with who we are." The tomb of Cyrus, a lone ziggurat amid the windswept ruins of his capital city, Pasargadae, is being carefully restored.
One of the most powerful drivers of the nuclear program is this resurgent nationalism, fueled not only by the confidence of oil bounty, but by long-standing resentment of foreign intervention in Iran's internal affairs, and by a sense that Iran is at last taking its proper place in the region and the world. Support for a nuclear Iran is fervent. Why India, Pakistan and Israel, and not us?
Since its uranium enrichment was revealed, the Natanz nuclear facility has been ringed by electronic surveillance and anti-aircraft guns. From the road, the above-ground buildings look like any other industrial plant dotted across the flat Isfahan hinterland - petrochemicals, steel, concrete, oil refining.
Photos are strictly forbidden.
We stare hard as we pass by, stopping only at one of the shabby wayside gas stations and snack bars. The pace is steady. Intercity buses have their speed controlled by GPS checked against a digital tachygraph that the driver has to produce at police checkpoints, with his ID.
While the average Iranian undoubtedly opposes Israel as an oppressive occupier of Palestinian land, anti-Israelism is not a defining element of Iranian-Persian identity. There are no specific quarrels, no disputed borders. Educated Iranians cite historical associations with Jews, and are aware that Teheranis such as Moshe Katsav and Shaul Mofaz became prominent Israelis. They laugh at the thought of Iran attacking Israel - unless Israel attacks first.
The ruling regime, of course, remains implacably hostile. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's "annihilate Israel" comments were not original, but repeated Ayatollah Khomeini's mantras of some years before. Former president Muhammad Khatami spoke of Israel as "a plague," a "terrorist racist Zionist regime."
The newest twist, in Iranian TV's documentary The Secrets of Armageddon, is that international Zionism aims not only to take over the world, but to turn Iran into a location for Armageddon.
Iranians readily admit that they help to train and supply Hizbullah and Hamas. "There is a balance," said one. "We support these two groups against a strong Israel. That's fine so long as the balance doesn't change." What Teheran thinks about the balance in view of Israel's attack on Gaza remains to be seen.
Yet the preoccupations of most Iranians are not about conquest, destroying Israel, raising the flag of jihad or retrieving Muslim land for Allah. The parlous state of the economy - 25 percent to 30% inflation and 20% unemployment - dominates conversations and already overshadows the May 2009 elections. Iranians are daily reminded of their devalued currency: Thick green wads of 20,000-rial notes, each worth about $1, are needed for every transaction.
The labor force is swollen by two million illegal foreign workers, mostly from Afghanistan, and thousands of Iraqi refugees. Some Iranians find work in the black market that flourishes across porous borders for all kinds of goods, including large quantities of drugs and alcohol - liquor is readily available from car trunks if you know a clandestine dealer's cellphone number. But many unemployed graduates emigrate, voting with their feet in a large and damaging brain drain.
Everywhere, one hears complaints about Ahmadinejad. A former mayor of Teheran, he had no national standing before becoming president. Elected by only 10 million of the 17 million who bothered to vote, he is derided for his economically unsound policies, financial mismanagement and embarrassing behavior on the international stage. "He has attracted enemies unnecessarily," said one Iranian.
By some estimates, only 15% of the population supports Ahmadinejad's rigid fundamentalism. A devout believer in the reappearance of Shi'ite Islam's 12th imam, who will restore justice to the world (and hopefully to Iran), the president keeps an empty chair beside him at cabinet meetings, which many regard as extreme. There are new claims of cronyism. The interior minister being impeached for his fake Oxford PhD certificate is a friend of Ahmadinejad, who, it is said, must have known.
Although the regime's grip has diminished since the 1980s - partly to avoid antagonizing the country's huge youth population, partly because of more pressing concerns - criticism is quickly stifled. Newspapers critical of the government are closed down, most recently the popular weekly Shahravande Emrouz, for "publishing baseless news about President Ahmadinejad's administration..."
Activists in the 1-million-signature campaign to change discriminatory laws against women are being harassed, arrested and even imprisoned. Under Iranian law no woman can retain custody of children older than seven, and a woman's testimony is worth half that of a man's.
The overriding political problem is that there is no organized or national opposition, and the numerous individuals and groups who privately oppose the regime have no shared forum. Dissident students are not allowed a voice. This is no 1979, when a broad-based anti-shah opposition including communists, republicans, intellectuals and Islamists delivered a revolution.
Yet there is considerable restiveness. Seventy percent of the population is younger than 30, beneficiaries of the government's pro-baby policy after the massive death toll of the Iran-Iraq War.
Many are avid Internet users and bloggers, and plugged into illegal satellite TV. They are internationally aware, curious, lively, unfailingly courteous, more secular, but very nationalistic.
"We lead a double life," several explained. "What was public before the revolution [alcohol consumption, freedom of dress] is now private, and what was private [religious observance] is now public. When we close the doors of our homes, we are in a different world."
Here and there, hijabs are brighter colored and pushed back to reveal hair, and women's garments more figure-hugging, often worn over jeans. The vigilantes who once barged unannounced into private homes to check on religious observance are now rarely seen except at public events.
In the republic's early years, the ruling clerics tried to run the economy along strict Islamic lines, with disastrous results. Attempts to diversify under the moderately reformist Khatami (1997-2005) were sabotaged by powerful clerical cadres.
Thirty years after the revolution the economy remains heavily oil-dependent, incompetently managed and now stricken by a plunging oil price that also puts at risk Ahmadinejad's expensive populist commitments. The International Monetary Fund has calculated that Iran needs an oil price of $95 a barrel just to balance its budget.
The economic malaise has reached crisis point. In November a conference on international investment in tourism was held in Teheran with the express aims of job creation and diversifying the economy away from oil. A 20-year plan is targeting 20 million tourists. Tax and land use incentives were offered, along with an extensive list of historic sites requiring development from cultural heritage to accommodation, eco-tourism and handicraft villages.
The main participants were Turks - scoffed at as minor players by one Teherani businessman who has felt the bite of US-led financial sanctions as he failed to secure overseas contracts. Government interference in Iran's private sector has long made it a high-risk investment. But the recently stepped-up sanctions on banks that do business with Iran have cut far deeper than the UN measures. Many foreign banks are refusing loans to Iranians, creating difficulties for trade financing and payments - and for major sectoral development such as tourism.
Those calling for Khatami to stand again in May do so knowing that the regime's control of the Majlis, and the powers of the shadowy Guardian Council, are unlikely to change. The council's strict vetting of all parliamentary candidates disqualified hundreds from the 2005 election. "It doesn't matter who is elected president next year," said one Iranian grimly, "the system remains the same."
In the background, however, is the relentless demographic surge, a groundswell for change. Yet the change wanted by many Iranians is not more Westernization or imposed solutions. Some say that what may emerge is a religious democracy with its own norms and values, but it will be novel, and quintessentially Iranian.
The US presidential election aroused some excitement. "Forty years is a special number," exclaimed one young Teherani. "[Barack] Obama has become president 40 years after Bobby Kennedy said that a black man would do this. It will soon be 40 years since our revolution, and we have a new young generation that does not share the values of the present regime. I can feel the winds of change coming."
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