Official Name: Republic of Suriname
PROFILE
Geography
Area: 163,194 sq. km. (63,037 sq. mi.); slightly larger than Georgia.
Cities: Capital--Paramaribo (pop. 242,946). Other cities--Nieuw Nickerie, Moengo, Brownsweg, Albina.
Terrain: Rain forest, savanna, coastal swamps, hills.
Climate: Tropical.
People
Nationality: Noun--Surinamer(s). Adjective--Surinamese.
Population (2004 census): 492,829.
Annual growth rate (2004): 1.30%.
Ethnic groups (2004 census): Hindustani (East Indian) 27%, Creole 18%, Javanese 15%, Maroon 15%, mixed 12.5%, Amerindians 3.7%, Chinese 1.8%.
Religions: Hindu, Muslim, Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed, Moravian, several other Christian denominations, Jewish, Baha'i.
Languages: Dutch (official), English (widely spoken in Paramaribo), Sranan Tongo (Creole language), Hindustani, Javanese.
Education: Years compulsory--ages 6-12. Literacy--90%.
Health: Infant mortality rate (2004)--7 per 1,000. Life expectancy (2003)--71 yrs.
Work force (100,000): Government--35%; private sector--41%; parastatal companies--10%; unemployed--14%.
Government
Type: Constitutional democracy.
Constitution: September 30, 1987.
Independence: November 25, 1975.
Branches: Executive--President, Vice President, Council of Ministers. Legislative--elected 51-member National Assembly made up of representatives of political parties. Judicial--Court of Justice.
Administrative subdivisions: 10 districts.
Political parties: Governing coalition—(1) Mega Combination: National Democratic Party (NDP), (PALU), (KTPI), and New Suriname (NS). (2) ACombination: ABOP, BEP, SEEKA; (3) People’s Alliance: (PL). Other parties in the National Assembly—(1) New Front: National Party of Suriname (NPS), (VHP), Suriname Labor Party (SPA), (DA’91). (2) (DOE).
Suffrage: Universal at 18.
Economy
GDP (2010 est.) US$ 3.3 billion (Source: ECLAC)
Annual growth rate real GDP (2010 est.): 3%
Per capita GDP (2010 est.): US$ 6,250
Inflation (2010): 10% (at time of this report: 21% per March 2011)
Natural resources: Bauxite, gold, oil, iron ore, other minerals; forests; hydroelectric potential, water, fish and shrimp.
Agriculture: rice, bananas, timber, citrus fruits, fish and shrimp.
Industry: alumina, oil, gold, lumber.
Trade (Source: ECLAC) ): Exports (2010 est.)—US$ 1.887 billion: alumina, gold, crude oil, wood and wood products, rice, and bananas. Imports (2010 est.)—US$ 1.570 billion: machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods, mineral fuels including lubricants, food and live animals.
PEOPLE
Most Surinamers live in the narrow, northern coastal plain. For its size, the population is one of the most ethnically diverse in the world. Each ethnic group preserves its own culture, and many institutions, including political parties, tend to follow ethnic lines. Informal relationships vary: the upper classes of all ethnic backgrounds mix freely; outside of the elite, social relations tend to remain within ethnic groupings. All groups may be found in schools and the workplace.
HISTORY
Arawak and Carib tribes lived in the region before Columbus sighted the coast in 1498. Spain officially claimed the area in 1593, but Spanish and Portuguese explorers of the time gave the area little attention. Dutch settlement began in 1616 at the mouths of several rivers between present-day Georgetown, Guyana, and Cayenne, French Guiana.
Suriname became a Dutch colony in 1667. The new colony, Dutch Guiana, did not thrive. Historians cite several reasons for this, including Holland's preoccupation with its more extensive (and profitable) East Indian territories, violent conflict between whites and native tribes, and frequent uprisings by the imported slave population, which was often treated with extraordinary cruelty. Many of the slaves fled to the interior, where they maintained a West African culture and established the six major Maroon tribes in existence today: the NDjuka, Saramaccaner, Matuwari, Paramaccaner, Kwinti, and Aluku.
Plantations steadily declined in importance as labor costs rose. Rice, bananas, and citrus fruits replaced the traditional crops of sugar, coffee, and cocoa. Gold exports began to increase in 1900. The Dutch Government gave little financial support to the colony. Suriname's economy was transformed in the years following World War I, when an American firm (ALCOA) began exploiting bauxite deposits in East Suriname. Bauxite processing and then alumina production began in 1916. During World War II, more than 75% of U.S. bauxite imports came from Suriname.
In 1951, Suriname began to acquire a growing measure of autonomy from the Netherlands. Suriname became an autonomous part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on December 15, 1954, and gained independence, with Dutch consent, on November 25, 1975.
Most of Suriname's political parties took shape during the autonomy period and were overwhelmingly based on ethnicity. For example, the National Party of Suriname found its support among the Creoles, the Progressive Reform Party members came from the Hindustani population, and the Indonesian Peasant's Party was Javanese. Other smaller parties found support by appealing to voters on an ideological or pro-independence platform; the Partij Nationalistische Republiek (PNR) was among the most important. Its members pressed most strongly for independence and for the introduction of leftist political and economic measures. Many former PNR members would go on to play a key role following the coup of February 1980.
Suriname was a parliamentary democracy in the years immediately following independence. Henck Arron became the first Prime Minister and was re-elected in 1977. On February 25, 1980, 16 noncommissioned officers overthrew the elected government, which many accused of inefficiency and mismanagement. The military-dominated government then suspended the constitution on August 13, 1980, dissolved the legislature, and formed a regime that ruled by decree. Although a civilian filled the post of president, military officer Desire Bouterse ruled the country in practice.
Throughout 1982, pressure grew for a return to civilian rule. On December 8, 1982, military authorities cracked down, arresting and killing 15 prominent opposition leaders, including journalists, lawyers, university lecturers, military officers, and a trade union leader.
Following the murders, the United States and the Netherlands suspended economic and military cooperation with the Bouterse regime, which increasingly began to follow an erratic but often leftist-oriented political course. The regime restricted the press and limited the rights of its citizens. The economy declined rapidly after the suspension of economic aid from the Netherlands.
Continuing economic decline brought pressure for change. During the 1984-87 period, the Bouterse regime tried to end the crisis by appointing a succession of nominally civilian-led cabinets. Many figures in the government came from the traditional political parties that had been pushed aside during the coup. The military eventually agreed to free elections in 1987, a new constitution, and a civilian government.
Pressure for change also erupted in July 1986, when a Maroon insurgency, led by former soldier Ronnie Brunswijk, began attacking economic targets in the country's interior. Brunswijk and his supporters formed the Jungle Commando and were later joined by the Amer-Indian Tucajana group. In response, the army ravaged villages and killed suspected Brunswijk supporters. One of these villages was Moiwana, of which 50 villagers, mostly women and children, were killed. (In 2007 the Moiwana Human Rights Organization successfully requested the OAS and International Organization for Human Rights to order the Surinamese Government to compensate the relatives of the victims and to rebuild the village). Thousands of Maroons fled to nearby French Guiana. In an effort to end the bloodshed, the Surinamese Government negotiated a peace treaty in 1989 with Brunswijk, called the Kourou Accord. However, Bouterse and other military leaders blocked the accord's implementation.
On December 24, 1990, military officers forced the civilian president and vice president to resign, through a so-called “telephone coup.”. Military-selected replacements were hastily approved by the National Assembly on December 29 with 77-year old Johan Kraag appointed as president and Jules Wijdenbosch as vice president from December 29, 1990 – September 1991. Faced with mounting pressure from the U.S., the nations of the Organization of American States (OAS), and others, the government held new elections on May 25, 1991. The New Front (NF) Coalition, were able to win a majority in the National Assembly. On September 6, 1991, Ronald Venetiaan was elected President, and Jules Ajodhia became Vice President.
The Venetiaan government was able to implement a settlement to Suriname's domestic insurgency through the August 1992 Peace Accord with the Maroon-based Jungle Commando and the Amerindian Tucajana rebels. In April 1993, Desire Bouterse left his position as commander of the armed forces and was replaced by Arthy Gorre, a military officer committed to bringing the armed forces under civilian government control. Economic reforms instituted by the Venetiaan government eventually helped curb inflation, unify the official and unofficial exchange rates, and improve the government's economic situation by re-establishing relations with the Dutch, opening the way for a major influx of Dutch financial assistance. Despite these successes, the governing coalition lost support and failed to retain control of the government in the subsequent round of national elections. The rival National Democratic Party (NDP), founded by Desire Bouterse, benefited from the New Front government's loss of popularity. NDP vice chairman Jules Wijdenbosch became president of an NDP-led coalition government and Pertaap Radhakishun became the Vice-President. Divisions and subsequent reshufflings of coalition members in the fall of 1997 and early 1998 weakened the coalition's mandate and slowed legislative action.
In May 1999, after mass demonstrations protesting poor economic conditions, the government was forced to call early elections. The elections in May 2000 returned Ronald Venetiaan and his New Front coalition to the presidency. The NF based its campaign on a platform of fixing the faltering Surinamese economy.
In the national election held on May 25, 2005, the ruling NF coalition suffered a significant setback due to widespread dissatisfaction with the state of the economy and the public perception that the NF had produced few tangible gains. Desire Bouterse's NDP more than doubled its representation in the National Assembly. Bouterse, the NDP's declared presidential candidate, withdrew from the race days before the National Assembly convened to vote for the next president and tapped his running mate, Rabin Parmessar, to run as the NDP's candidate. In the National Assembly, the NF challenged Parmessar's Surinamese citizenship, displaying copies of a Dutch passport issued to Parmessar in 2004. Parmessar was eventually allowed to stand for election, and parliament later confirmed his Surinamese citizenship. After two votes, no candidate received the required two-thirds majority, pushing the final decision in August 2005 to a special session of the United People's Assembly, where President Venetiaan was reelected to a third term with a significant majority of votes from the local, district, and national assembly members. His running mate, Ramdien Sardjoe, was elected as vice president. While the Venetiaan administration had made progress in stabilizing the economy, tensions within the coalition continued to impede progress and stymied legislative action.
Long-anticipated legal proceedings against those accused of participating in the December 1982 murders began in November 2007 with the issuance of summonses to 25 defendants, including opposition leader Desire Bouterse. The court martial tribunal convened on November 30, 2007, with a series of preliminary motions. The actual trial with judges hearing witness testimonies started on July 4, 2008. Trial proceedings have continued since then, and the case is ongoing.
The Venetiaan government lost power in the elections of May 25, 2010, when the opposition’s Mega Combination (MC), led by Desire Bouterse, won a majority in the National Assembly. The MC formed a majority coalition with several political parties to bring their total to 36 seats in the National Assembly and elected Jennifer Geerlings-Simons as Speaker of the Assembly, and Ruth Wijdenbosch as vice-speaker. Desire Bouterse was elected President of Suriname and Robert Ameerali as Vice President with all 36 coalition votes cast in their favor.
This was the first time in Suriname’s history that both a president and Vice President were elected with a large majority in the National Assembly. The new President and Vice President were sworn in on August 12, 2010.
GOVERNMENT
The Republic of Suriname is a constitutional democracy based on the 1987 constitution. The legislative branch of government consists of a 51-member unicameral National Assembly, simultaneously and popularly elected for a 5-year term.
The executive branch is headed by the president, who is elected by a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly or, failing that, by a majority of the People's Assembly for a 5-year term. If at least two-thirds of the National Assembly cannot agree to vote for one presidential candidate, a People's Assembly is formed from all National Assembly delegates and regional and municipal representatives who were elected by popular vote in the most recent national election. A vice president, normally elected at the same time as the president, needs a simple majority in the National Assembly or People's Assembly to be elected for a 5-year term. As head of government, the president appoints a cabinet of ministers, currently numbered at 17 and apportioned among the various political parties represented in the ruling coalition. There is no constitutional provision for removal or replacement of the president unless he resigns or passes away while in function.
A 15-member State Advisory Council advises the president in the conduct of policy. Eleven of the 15 council seats are allotted by proportional representation of all political parties represented in the National Assembly. The president chairs the council; two seats are allotted to representatives of labor, and two are allotted to employers' organizations.
The judiciary is headed by the Court of Justice (Supreme Court). This court supervises the magistrate courts. Members are appointed for life by the president in consultation with the National Assembly, the State Advisory Council, and the National Order of Private Attorneys.
The country is divided into 10 administrative districts, each headed by a district commissioner appointed by the president. The commissioner is somewhat similar to the governor of a U.S. state but serves at the president's pleasure.
Principal Government Officials
President--Desire Delano Bouterse
Vice President-- Robert Ameerali
Foreign Minister--Winston Lackin
National Security Advisor-Melvin Linscheer
Speaker of the National Assembly - Jennifer Geerlings-Simon
Ambassador to U.S.--Subhaas Mungra
Ambassador to UN--Henry MacDonald
Ambassador to OAS--Subhaas Mungra
Suriname maintains an embassy in the United States at 4301 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 460, Washington, DC 20008 (tel. 202-244-7488; fax. 202-244-5878). The embassy also manages Suriname's representation to the Organization of American States (OAS). Suriname has a separate mission to the UN, located at 866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 320, New York, NY 10017 (tel. 212-826-0660; fax. 212-980-7029). There also is a Suriname consulate general at 6303 Blue Lagoon Drive, Suite 325, Miami, FL 33126 (tel. 305-265-4655, fax. 305-265-4599).
NATIONAL SECURITY
Surinamese armed forces consist of the national army, air force, navy, and military police, which are collectively referred to as the “national army,” under the control of the Minister of Defense. A smaller civil police force is under the authority of the Minister of Justice and Police. The national armed forces comprise some 2,500 personnel, the majority of whom are deployed as light infantry security forces. The Netherlands has provided limited military assistance to the Surinamese armed forces since the election of a democratic government in 1991. In recent years, the U.S. has provided training to military officers and policymakers to promote a better understanding of the role of the military in a civilian government, as well as to improve the professional capabilities of its officers and senior personnel. The U.S. also provides assistance and training for disaster preparedness and mitigation as well as significant support for humanitarian aid projects. Since the mid-1990s, the People's Republic of China has provided small amounts of military equipment and logistical material to the Surinamese armed forces. The Netherlands, France, Venezuela, and Brazil also have working relationships with the Surinamese military.
Suriname's borders are porous; largely uninhabited, unguarded, and ungoverned rain forest and rivers make up the eastern, western, and southern borders, and the navy's capability to police Suriname's northern Atlantic coast is limited. Protecting natural resources from illegal exploitation such as unlicensed gold mining is difficult, and significant tax revenue is lost. Porous borders also make Suriname a target for transshipment of drugs.
ECONOMY
Suriname's economy has been dominated by the exports of gold and oil, and to a lesser extent, alumina. Other export products include bananas, rice, and lumber. On the heels of rising world prices for fuel and record prices for gold, these sectors have booked significant successes in 2010. The bauxite sector continued to struggle as world demand for aluminum remained weak. According to the Economic Council for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) Suriname’s economy grew by 3 percent in 2010, less than the Latin American average of 6 percent, but significantly better than the Caribbean average of .5 percent. ECLAC predicts that Suriname’s economy will continue to grow in 2011, but at a lesser percentage of 1.2 percent. Suriname’s bauxite deposits have been among the world's richest. After a long standing relationship with Australian owned BHPBilliton, Alcoa subsidiary Suralco became the 100 percent owner of all activities in the bauxite sector on August 1, 2009 after BHPBilliton departed Suriname. In the wake of the world economic crisis this sector has continued to struggle and alumina has lost the importance it once had for the Surinamese economy. In order to survive this world crisis Suralco was forced to postpone all non-essential maintenance, stop all capital investments, and lower production. Another reason cited for reducing production was the expected depletion of reserves in the mines, Kaaimangrasie and Klaverblad, from which the company was operating. Since then, the company has commenced preparations to prepare its concession in the Nassau area in Southeastern Suriname for mining. This new mine is expected to be ready for production in 2013. Additionally the company also launched a bauxite exploration division in 2010 to research possible bauxite residue in areas already mined. This residue is expected to be of a lesser quality, but will, with additional processes, provide sufficient bauxite to keep the refinery operational. The takeover of BHPBilliton assets also left Suralco managing 60,000 hectares of land, of which part is in use by the government. In 2010 the company embarked on a Land Management Program aimed at rehabilitating land no longer being used for mining purposes, and in the case of government-owned land, returning it to its owner. In January 2011 the Government of Suriname officially announced that it was interested in resuming negotiations with Suralco for 40 years worth of bauxite reserves in Western Suriname in the Bakhuys area.
In the formal gold sector, the Government of Suriname (GoS) has announced that it plans to sign an agreement with Surgold, the joint venture company between Alcoa subsidiary Suralco and Newmont Mining Corporation, later this year. The agreement will allow for the mining of gold in the Merian area in Southeastern Suriname in the Nassau Concession, as well as the building of a second gold refinery. This agreement has been under negotiation since 2008. The proven reserves in this area are 3 million troy ounces. At the country’s first gold refinery, Rosebel Gold Mine (owned by Canadian mining giant Iamgold), production for the first nine months of 2010 was 276,000 troy ounces at an average production cost of US$ 499 per troy ounce. The company invested approx. US$ 49 million in exploration. Per December 2009 the proven reserves at Rosebel were 2.6 million troy ounces, while the probable reserves were 2.2 million troy ounces. The Rosebel Gold Mine continues to be the most profitable mine in the Iamgold portfolio, with the highest production levels at the lowest production costs.
In January 2011 the GoS embarked on an ambitious plan to order the informal gold sector. Once considered small-scale this untaxed and unregulated sector is currently estimated at US$ 1 billion annually. Thousands of Brazilians, mostly illegal, and local maroons find employment in this sector. Chinese shop owners have also set up businesses, also unregulated, near the mining sites. The GoS has set up different commissions that will deal with organizing and registering miners, developing legislation to regulate the sector, and to work on making this sector not only sustainable, but also environmentally safe. In the first instance the miners, owners of equipment, concession holders and all others with activities in the sector were asked to register with a special registration office set up by the GoS. In its first week of operations 3,500 persons registered with this office and its 2 satellite sites. To further simplify the registration process, the government intends to open another 5 satellite sites. The government also intends to establish special one-stop centers in the interior for miners to conduct all their activities with the government. In a follow up process the government will also work on the status of the miners. Miners who do not have a permit to be in the country will be allowed to get their paperwork in order to stay.
2010 was a very successful year for Suriname’s oil sector. State-owned State Oil Company Suriname (Staatsolie) reported a gross income of US$ 568 million, which was up by 32 percent compared to 2009 and just US$ 8 million shy from the company’s record earnings of 2008. This was primarily due to increased production and favorable world market prices. Gross profits of US$ 285 million were an increase of 57 percent compared 2009. Tax and dividend payments to the government in 2010 totaled US$ 186 million. Staatsolie produced 5.8 million barrels at an average price of US$ 72 per barrel. Staatsolie is in the midst of implementing its US$ 1 billion expansion project. Of this amount 75 percent will come direct from internal investments. The company took out a US$ 235 million loan from international banks. A national bond issuance brought in US$ 55 million.
Suriname has attracted the attention of international companies interested in extensive development of a tropical hardwoods industry and possible diamond mining. However, proposals for exploitation of the country's tropical forests and undeveloped regions of the interior traditionally inhabited by indigenous and Maroon communities have raised the concerns of environmentalists and human rights activists in Suriname and abroad.
Although Suriname’s energy supply situation has improved, the country continues to have a shortage in affordable energy to support any major expansion of its economy. The bauxite refinery at Paranam depends primarily on diesel generated energy to support its refining operations. According to Surgold, any refinery built in southeastern Suriname will also have to be powered by diesel generated energy. The doubling of the capacity of the power generating plant of Staatsolie has helped in easing the demand for power in Paramaribo. Actualization of the Tapa-Jai project should further help ease demand issues.
Tourism figures for 2008 through 2010 have remained stagnant. The majority of tourists visiting Suriname continue to come from the Netherlands, with some “weekend tourists” from French Guiana. The number of tourists visiting Suriname from other Caribbean countries is on the rise. Tourist organizations have identified the lengthy visa process for Suriname as one of the obstacles to tourism growth, as well as logistics and infrastructure. The lack of organization within the sector has also been identified as playing an important role. In 2009 Suriname was named as one of the top ten destinations in the world for New Year’s Eve celebrations. Additionally the country was also named a top destination spot by Lonely Planet magazine. Suriname’s Ministry of Transport, Communication and Tourism actively takes part in different tourism fairs around the world, primarily Europe, in an effort to promote Suriname. Different private tourism companies are also making efforts to promote Suriname as a tourism destination.
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Since independence in 1975, Suriname has become a member of 14 international organizations: the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Non-Aligned Movement. Suriname is a member of the Caribbean Community and Common Market and the Association of Caribbean States; it is associated with the European Union through the Lome Convention. The Netherlands has been Suriname's biggest donor, since independence, but has been surpassed by the U.S. as a trade partner. Suriname participates in the Amazonian Pact, a grouping of the countries of the Amazon Basin that focuses on protection of the Amazon region's natural resources from environmental degradation. Reflecting its status as a major bauxite producer, Suriname is also a member of the International Bauxite Association. The country also belongs to the Economic Commission for Latin America, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. In 2008, Suriname signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Since taking office in 2010, the Bouterse government has focused on bolstering its regional relationships, assuming leadership positions in multilateral organizations such as the OAS, UNASUR, and CARICOM, and strengthening its ties to France, Venezuela, China, and Cuba. Bilateral relations with The Netherlands have weakened due to its strong statements against the Bouterse presidency and when he assumed office, as well as the decline in economic assistance with the completion of the Treaty Funds.
At independence, Suriname signed an agreement with the Netherlands providing for about $1.5 billion in development assistance grants and loans over a 10- to 15-year period, called the Treaty Funds. Initial disbursements amounted to about $100 million per year, but were discontinued during the 1980’s period of military rule. After the return to a democratically elected government in 1991, Dutch aid resumed. The Dutch relationship continued to be an important factor in the economy, with the Dutch insisting that Suriname undertake economic reforms and produce specific plans acceptable to the Dutch for projects on which aid funds could be spent. In 2000, the Dutch revised the structure of their aid package and signaled to the Surinamese authorities their decision to disburse aid by sectoral priorities as opposed to individual projects. In 2001 both governments agreed to spend the remaining development funds to finance programs in 6 different sectors: health care, education, environment, agriculture, housing, and governance. In 2008 the Dutch aid was fully allocated to all identified and jointly approved sector programs, which started the process of ending the Dutch donor aid to Suriname. In 2010, the Netherlands stated that Dutch Treaty funds had been allocated and should be fully depleted by 2012. .
Bilateral cooperation agreements with several countries in the region have underscored the government's interest in strengthening regional ties. The return to Suriname from French Guiana of about 8,000 refugees from the 1986-91 Interior War between the military and domestic insurgents has improved relations with French authorities. Longstanding border disputes with Guyana and French Guiana remain unresolved. Negotiations with the Government of Guyana brokered by the Jamaican Prime Minister in 2000 did not produce an agreement, but the countries agreed to restart talks after Guyanese national elections in 2001. In January 2002, the presidents of Suriname and Guyana met in Suriname and agreed to resume negotiations, establishing the Suriname-Guyana border commission. In 2004 Guyana brought a complaint against Suriname under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regarding their maritime border dispute. In 2007, the UN International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) ruled that both Suriname and Guyana are entitled to their share of the disputed offshore basin which is believed to be rich in oil and gas deposits. Using the equidistance line, the tribunal awarded Suriname 6,900 sq. miles and Guyana 12,800 sq. miles of this basin. Suriname's earlier dispute with Brazil ended amicably after formal demarcation of their shared border.
Suriname is densely forested, and increased interest in large-scale commercial logging and mining in Suriname's interior have raised environmental concerns. The U.S. Forest Service, the Smithsonian, and numerous non-governmental environmental organizations have promoted technical cooperation with the Surinamese Government to prevent destruction of the country's tropical rain forest, one of the most diverse ecosystems in the world. U.S. experts have worked closely with local natural resource officials to encourage sustainable development of the interior and alternatives such as ecotourism. On December 1, 2000, UNESCO designated the 1.6 million hectare Central Suriname Nature Reserve a World Heritage site. Suriname's tourism sector remains a minor part of the economy, and tourist infrastructure is limited (in 2004, some 145,000 foreign tourists visited Suriname).
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
To Bersih or not to Bersih? – An Excerpt
A Concerned Malaysian
Jun 29, 11
Frankly, the above title is just a smart-ass title to get your attention. Indeed, "To Bersih or not to Bersih?" is not the question.
Before we even venture to consider such a question, let us be very clear what Bersih is.
Even in the newer version known as Bersih 2.0, it is still a coalition of non-governmental and civil society organisations that are collectively campaigning for clean, free and fair elections. (It is not a movement to defeat the incumbent government or one to support the election of the opposition.)
If I may put it in more concise terms, Bersih is a non-governmental-civil society coalition working towards electoral and political reforms in Malaysia.
I prefer this description simply because it's less value-laden than the official line, which presumes that Malaysian elections are unclean, unfree and unfair.
Out of the three adjectives, I can only honestly say, with clear evidence, that the third is obvious.
To me, and most rational people, a fair contest includes giving all contestants equal access to the judges via all legitimate channels; and, in the case of Malaysian elections, it is only fair if candidates and/or political parties are given equal access to voters via the mainstream and alternative media.
Indeed, to me, the single most important factor in any clean, free and fair election is the information that is made available to the voters, and it's very obvious that the mainstream media, which is under the Federal Government's regulations, is key.
Unfortunately, any party that is not a member of the current government coalition does not seem to have any chance whatsoever to be given publicity by the mainstream media except to cast them in a negative light.
Fair comment?
Now, before I come to the question of whether our nation's elections are clean and free, let me digress a little.
Most Bersih advocates and activists will talk about the electoral roll, the postal ballots, the use of indelible ink and the campaign period. Before I even go there, I'd like to ask the following basic question first:
Are the parliamentary and state constituencies delineated in a transparent and fair manner, which allows constituents to elect their preferred representatives and also enable their elected representatives to work effectively for their constituents?
To help you answer the basic question above, consider the following specific questions: Does it make sense to have constituencies where the areas covered do not have any real communal connection with each other?
And does it make sense that some constituencies have 20 times more voters than others? Further, is the 'first past the post' electoral system really the most effective way to provide voters with a meaningful election result?
I leave it to you to answer the above questions yourself. Whether you like it or not, these are questions that are critical to the fairness and effectiveness of our current electoral system, which - if answered honestly and objectively-will lead us to the logical conclusion that it needs to be reformed.
An acknowledgment that our electoral system needs to be reformed is not an admission that it is not clean, not free and not fair.
Like it or not, the current administration inherited the system from the previous administrations.
If the prime minister of the day wants to be seen as responsible and proactive, he should implement much-needed reforms before they are demanded by the people.
Having said that, it's not too late to do something about it. It's not how we start but how we finish that matters.
At the same time, the Bersih rally organisers must realise that their mandate is not simply to organise a rally but to achieve the so-called eight Bersih demands, which includes strengthening public institutions, stopping corruption and stopping corruption (apart from points covered above), by any effective and peaceful means.
It is very clear to me that Bersih's mandate is a long term one, which imposes on the leaders of the coalition a duty to not only address the Election Commission (EC) and the government of the day but also all participants of the political process in Malaysia.
It is very obvious that the EC cannot strengthen the judiciary and/or stop corruption in the police force. And it is also obvious that the EC cannot stop politicians from 'playing dirty', irrespective of whether they are BN, PR or independent.
If we, the People, represented by Bersih, want the government to reform, we must also be reasonable in our demands and expectations.
If we are sincere and serious about electoral and political reforms, let's work towards it with open minds, not with pre-conceived notions about BN, PR or the EC.
If there is a chance to hold public and/or televised roundtable talks with the EC and/or any interested party, why are we not accepting the offer?
If people want to get together to show their support for Bersih (or electoral and political reforms) and also to celebrate democracy, why can't we do it in a suitable place (read "safe place") instead of on the streets where our boys in blue don't seem to be able to control crowds in a friendly, professional and effective manner?
I am not saying what I am saying to stop people from walking for democracy.
On the contrary, I am saying what I am saying to encourage people to walk for democracy in a safe and effective manner.
Whilst it is the government's responsibility to promote and protect the rights to freedom of assembly and expression, we cannot exercise them and expect the government to undermine the exercise of the same rights by Perkasa and Umno Youth.
However, we can choose to work together with all parties in a fair and transparent process to enjoy the exercise of those rights in a safe, dignified and meaningful manner.
If we, the People of Malaysia, want the Government of Malaysia to change, the real question is, "Are we ready, willing and able to change first?"
Jun 29, 11
Frankly, the above title is just a smart-ass title to get your attention. Indeed, "To Bersih or not to Bersih?" is not the question.
Before we even venture to consider such a question, let us be very clear what Bersih is.
Even in the newer version known as Bersih 2.0, it is still a coalition of non-governmental and civil society organisations that are collectively campaigning for clean, free and fair elections. (It is not a movement to defeat the incumbent government or one to support the election of the opposition.)
If I may put it in more concise terms, Bersih is a non-governmental-civil society coalition working towards electoral and political reforms in Malaysia.
I prefer this description simply because it's less value-laden than the official line, which presumes that Malaysian elections are unclean, unfree and unfair.
Out of the three adjectives, I can only honestly say, with clear evidence, that the third is obvious.
To me, and most rational people, a fair contest includes giving all contestants equal access to the judges via all legitimate channels; and, in the case of Malaysian elections, it is only fair if candidates and/or political parties are given equal access to voters via the mainstream and alternative media.
Indeed, to me, the single most important factor in any clean, free and fair election is the information that is made available to the voters, and it's very obvious that the mainstream media, which is under the Federal Government's regulations, is key.
Unfortunately, any party that is not a member of the current government coalition does not seem to have any chance whatsoever to be given publicity by the mainstream media except to cast them in a negative light.
Fair comment?
Now, before I come to the question of whether our nation's elections are clean and free, let me digress a little.
Most Bersih advocates and activists will talk about the electoral roll, the postal ballots, the use of indelible ink and the campaign period. Before I even go there, I'd like to ask the following basic question first:
Are the parliamentary and state constituencies delineated in a transparent and fair manner, which allows constituents to elect their preferred representatives and also enable their elected representatives to work effectively for their constituents?
To help you answer the basic question above, consider the following specific questions: Does it make sense to have constituencies where the areas covered do not have any real communal connection with each other?
And does it make sense that some constituencies have 20 times more voters than others? Further, is the 'first past the post' electoral system really the most effective way to provide voters with a meaningful election result?
I leave it to you to answer the above questions yourself. Whether you like it or not, these are questions that are critical to the fairness and effectiveness of our current electoral system, which - if answered honestly and objectively-will lead us to the logical conclusion that it needs to be reformed.
An acknowledgment that our electoral system needs to be reformed is not an admission that it is not clean, not free and not fair.
Like it or not, the current administration inherited the system from the previous administrations.
If the prime minister of the day wants to be seen as responsible and proactive, he should implement much-needed reforms before they are demanded by the people.
Having said that, it's not too late to do something about it. It's not how we start but how we finish that matters.
At the same time, the Bersih rally organisers must realise that their mandate is not simply to organise a rally but to achieve the so-called eight Bersih demands, which includes strengthening public institutions, stopping corruption and stopping corruption (apart from points covered above), by any effective and peaceful means.
It is very clear to me that Bersih's mandate is a long term one, which imposes on the leaders of the coalition a duty to not only address the Election Commission (EC) and the government of the day but also all participants of the political process in Malaysia.
It is very obvious that the EC cannot strengthen the judiciary and/or stop corruption in the police force. And it is also obvious that the EC cannot stop politicians from 'playing dirty', irrespective of whether they are BN, PR or independent.
If we, the People, represented by Bersih, want the government to reform, we must also be reasonable in our demands and expectations.
If we are sincere and serious about electoral and political reforms, let's work towards it with open minds, not with pre-conceived notions about BN, PR or the EC.
If there is a chance to hold public and/or televised roundtable talks with the EC and/or any interested party, why are we not accepting the offer?
If people want to get together to show their support for Bersih (or electoral and political reforms) and also to celebrate democracy, why can't we do it in a suitable place (read "safe place") instead of on the streets where our boys in blue don't seem to be able to control crowds in a friendly, professional and effective manner?
I am not saying what I am saying to stop people from walking for democracy.
On the contrary, I am saying what I am saying to encourage people to walk for democracy in a safe and effective manner.
Whilst it is the government's responsibility to promote and protect the rights to freedom of assembly and expression, we cannot exercise them and expect the government to undermine the exercise of the same rights by Perkasa and Umno Youth.
However, we can choose to work together with all parties in a fair and transparent process to enjoy the exercise of those rights in a safe, dignified and meaningful manner.
If we, the People of Malaysia, want the Government of Malaysia to change, the real question is, "Are we ready, willing and able to change first?"
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